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luce tua
Teaching to Learn

T

H E WINTER SEMESTER BEGINS

PEACEFULLY.

When students return in the fall, they arrive
all at once, loud and energetic as they
reclaim a campus left to faculty and staff back in
May. But in January, they slip back into town quietly, perhaps less glad to be here than they were in
August. Perhaps less energetic too, fattened up
nicely from holiday feasts. The cold and darkness of
winter slows them down, and the season for feasts
gives way to the season for fasts. It is a good time to
focus on one's studies.
It is also a good time to focus on one's teaching,
as I have been doing lately. There is an endless supply of books written by teachers for teachers about
teaching. This may be because-as anyone who
spends much time in the classroom quickly recognizes-teaching is a mysterious craft. I never know
when the best class sessions are going to happen.
When they do happen, I'm never certain exactly
why. Was it my carefully chosen reading assignment? My well crafted lecture? My discussion questions? Most likely, it wasn't any of those things. I've
concluded that no matter what I do, a large part of
what makes my classes go well on any given day is
beyond my control. Did the students do the reading? Did the basketball game go into overtime and
keep them from the library? Did they get any sleep
last night?
Still, I read some of the teaching books, hoping
for insights. One that I looked at recently was
Patrick Allitt's I'm the Teacher, You're the Student
(Penn, 2004). The title tells you most of what you
need to know about Allitt's pedagogy. He is the
teacher, and his students are not allowed to forget
it. They are in his class to learn from him, not from
each other. Allitt seems almost obsessed with
maintaining authority, rules, and proper distance.
From his students, he wants no excuses, no hats in
class, and absolutely no information about their
personal lives. He also comes off as a brilliant,
engaging, and creative teacher, someone I would
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have loved to take a class from, but I don't believe
that his authoritarian approach is what makes him
a good teacher. Although I respect (even envy) the
control that Allitt maintains over his classes, the
more I read of his book, the more I became convinced that his rules and regulations contribute far
more to simplifying his teaching than to facilitating
his students' learning.
Experience has taught me that I need to enforce
deadlines, hold students accountable, and watch for
inappropriate classroom behavior. When I fail to do
those things, my job gets much more complicated
than it needs to be. I already have enough work to
do without allowing students to create more for
me. At the same time, I don't believe that any student ever learned anything simply because I
graded him down on a late paper. At least, nothing
other than to get his papers done by the due date
next time-which is something, but that is not the
kind of teaching that excites me.
In something else I read recently, I found more
valuable insights about the craft of teaching.
For who is so foolishly curious that he
sends his son to school to learn what the
teacher thinks? But when they have
explained, through words, all those sciences that they profess to teach, even the
sciences of wisdom and virtue, then those
called students consider within themselves
whether the truth was spoken, looking, in
fact, at that truth within them to the extent
they are able. It is then that they learn, and
when they find, within themselves, that the
truth has been spoken, they give praise.
Augustine wrote those lines in a dialogue
called "On the Teacher" (included in Mark
Schwehn's Everyone a Teacher, Notre Dame, 2000).
These are words that will keep a teacher humble.
Teachers can be wise and learned and teach the
truth, and it might not matter at alL All our efforts

will come to naught unless our students take the
next step and "consider within themselves whether
the truth was spoken." That moment-the moment
when a student considers what we have said, compares it to what she already knows or believes, and
decides whether or not to accept it as true-is when
learning occurs. Even when they reject what we
have taught, students learn, and they learn mostly
because of their own efforts.
Most teachers at least would assent to
Augustine's point, but I'm not sure we always teach
that way. I have no doubt that I usually walk into
my classroom with expectations far too high about
what my students will learn during that single hour
of their day. I constantly have to remind myself that
my job is not to convey large quantities of information to my students but to give them both the tools
and the motivation to learn more on their own.
Many students, I suspect, would reject
Augustine's argument outright. Many, if not most,
students today don't go to college seeking truth of
the sort Augustine had in mind. They go to college
seeking credentials that will get them the job they
want, and they expect teachers to help them get that
job. This attitude can make them very passive about
their role in their own education. They expect to
receive some sort of knowledge-hopefully "useful" knowledge, and, in their opinion, a good
teacher is one who finds clever ways to pass this
knowledge on to them. Many students actually tell
me that they prefer traditional lectures to class discussion, because they agree with Allitt that they
aren't in class to learn from the other students but
from the professors.
Augustine's words serve as a reminder to both
teachers and students who think like that. Teachers
must remember that what they teach is not the most
important part of their students' education; students must recognize that unless they are actively
engaged in their own education, they are not going
to learn much. As teachers we can help our students
to read, to think, and to search for the truth, but we
cannot give it to them.
But is Augustine's understanding of education
still relevant in today's academy of modern
sciences, pre-professional programs, and credential seekers? It makes me cautious when
Augustine goes on to say that the truth within our

students-the truth against which my words are
to be measured-is a truth taught to them by
Christ, "who is said to dwell in the innermost
man." Augustine reminds us that God is the only
teacher of truth.
Most contemporary academics are not accustomed to thinking of their teaching in quite those
terms. I am a political scientist, not a pastor or
priest. I believe that what I teach is true, but I doubt
that my courses often lead students directly to
"Truth"- or at least the kind of truth that Augustine
meant. Most of the things that I teach aboutnations, constitutions, ideologies-are transient.
They come and they go. I may suggest that some of
the things we talk about in class-for example justice and virtue-are more lasting and not so contingent on place and time, but my goal is not to make
students believe one thing or another about such
ideas. My hope is that taking my class will lead students to become thoughtful and articulate about
this particular forum of human knowledge, and
that they will become accustomed to doing what
Augustine says they must do, to considering within
themselves whether the truth is spoken.
The ultimate goal of teaching in any discipline- humanities, social science, professional- is
not to convey a particular set of facts, concepts, or
propositions. It should be to help students learn
how to look within themselves and use their Godgiven rational abilities to sort through everything
they are taught and everything that they experience
in their lives. In any class in any discipline, good
teachers do this. They teach their students to think,
to examine their world and themselves with honesty and clarity, to consider whether what they
believe is really true.
It is worth remembering this now, because the
present season is more than just a good time to be
focused on our studies. This season of fasts is a time
for us all to examine ourselves and our beliefs with
honesty, to simplify our lives so that we can reflect
with clarity. Good teachers help their students learn
how to do this, and, when we do, we help them
learn about things far more important that anything we teach inside our classrooms.

t

-JPO

DIE GLEICHHEIT
Is Emma still an immigrant having arrived here from Ingersheim
some fifty-three years ago, just behind Helmut and with two
children, Suse and Bernd, in tow? They were just old enough
to know that gute deutsche Kinder do as they are told, just young
enough to learn to speak English without the telling gutturals
their mother would never give up. Is she still an American woman
and German Frau? Never a Nazi and so not now. Is she still
the Lutheran she was born and raised to be, the widow she became?
Is she still Mama to Bernd, who, twenty-some years ago, handlebars
gripped, turned to look, then tipped his motor bike for the last time,
Mama not only to Suse, but also to George, beloved son-in-law,
not German at all, born on a Florida orchard, who's called Emma
Mama now for forty-some years? To Kristy and Matt for whom Mama
means Grandma, and for Erin and Thomas for whom it means, well,

Mama, and who do not remember Mama-not even her spaetzle or
sauerbraten -except as she was the last years, not knowing them at all,
but seeing in them her own childhood, her own beautiful Deutschland?
Is she still the seamstress, maker of drapes at House of Reagin, bending
over pleats and gathers, thrilled to be earning such a decent wage,
to have a clean, neat place to go each day, well into her eighties?
Is she still Betty's roommate, sleeping through, oblivious to
the snoring, no trouble at all, Mama to the babydoll Suse brought
her, now the pleasant child she is, herself? As we carry the meagerness
of her things through the tiled corridor and to the truck borrowed
for this last task, we wonder whether she lives in the ashes that she
has been burned to, just miles down this Indiana road: if they still
speak of her in the accent-

Emma, Mama, Heilige Frau.

Mary M. Brown
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Humility

Norman Wirzba
I
recently had a vision in which I saw our
best hope for the healing of the world. It
happened on Alva Stoll's farmyard and focused
on the face of his four-year-old granddaughter.
More exactly, it was her regard for me and her
quiet witness at the scene of our gathering that
took me in and gave me hope. Her vision was
both attractive and unsettling, since it communicated clearly and with profound simplicity how
worthy and beautiful life is, and how difficult the
path would be leading us from our current waywardness to our true happiness and good.
Alva and his nephew Paul had welcomed a
group of us to their farm and agreed to answer our
questions about Amish life, how and why they live
the way they do. Not long into our discussion,
Alva's granddaughter joined the group. She
stayed in our company for thirty minutes or more,
holding her Opa's hand and smiling at us the
whole time. There was nothing dramatic about her
appearance with us. She displayed simply the
quiet, yet powerful testimony of a child perfectly
content to be with her grandfather, on her farm,
happy to contribute to her family's welcome of us.
The calm and serenity of her presence made it
plain there was no place she would rather be.
My thirteen-year-old daughter was with me
on this occasion, and I asked her if there was anything unusual about this child. She noted how
other children likely would have found this adult
scene, maybe even the farm itself, utterly boring,
and so would have acted out in some way, clamoring for attention or diversion. Clearly she had
escaped the soul damage wrought by our entertainment and marketing industries! We also
remarked how attention and patience disorders
of all kinds have infiltrated child and adult
worlds alike. More and more, we seem unable to
rest quietly and non-contentiously in the summer
shade or in the embrace of a loving family

O

N AN AMISH FARM NORTH OF TORONTO,

member. Such tranquility, we seem to think, lacks
drama and is altogether too ordinary.
The memory of this girl has stayed with me,
mostly because she embodied (at that moment at
least) something about our common humanity
that is being forgotten and is virtually lost. She
demonstrated that human life is at its proper best
when it is humble. Humility is a form of life that
acknowledges and honors our rootedness in
place and community. It connotes a way or manner of being that tries to be faithful to and responsible for, rather than aggressively exceed or overreach, a person's life-giving contexts. It comes to
fruition as we learn to receive, enjoy, and cherish
each other and the world as gifts. In the presence
of this little girl, I came to understand how so
many of our social and environmental problems
stem from human arrogance and our inability
(sometimes outright refusal) to live sympathetically and harmoniously wherever we are. I also
saw that if our communities and habitats are to
have a future worth protecting, then we had better learn to adopt the ways of humility.
I have no doubt that the attentive and patient
ways modeled by her Amish elders had a lot to
contribute to this girl's humble sensibility, as did
the care and kindness they showed to their animals and each other. A grandma pulled a
younger girl around the yard on a wagon much
of the time we were there, thus allowing her to
sense her place in the community and on the
land. Equally important is the experience of
childhood itself, experience that at its best is
immersed in play and discovery. To experience
the world and our place in it with childlike wonder and trust leads to humility, because it is in the
context of the world's grandeur that we begin to
see the true silliness of our often pretentious
ways. When we live a humble life, we help create
a world in which respect, restraint, care, peace,
and celebration can flourish.

I am sure Alva's granddaughter is not perfect,
drain or damper on life, the humility in evidence on
and that she has her share of trouble. Nor do I
this farm showed how it is possible to work and
wish to romanticize her Amish community as the
play in ways that ennoble and honor it.
unending and thorough display of humility. What
In making a case for humility, we are not
I want to emphasize is that her community, the
helped by the fact that it is extremely difficult to
way it lives and thinks, makes possible and more
speak honestly or rigorously about it. Quite
likely (in a way that our society clearly does not)
rightly, we are suspicious of those who talk about
the humble disposition so clearly in evidence in
humility too much, for what could be more
this young girl. We need to remember that even as
ridiculous than to argue for one's own humility?
the Amish work through problems of their own,
Moreover, shows of humility are often false or
they at least are not directly responsible for the
deceptive as people only feign meekness to
litany of woes we now face: degraded soils, consecure some personal advantage. False posturing
taminated water, anxious livestock, nuclear waste,
and insincere flattery, while suggesting the
bio-pollution, super pests, antibiotic-resistant
recognition of one's "humble" rank, actually
turns into mockery as we play the insepathogens, melting ice caps and glaciers,
curity of others to a self-serving end.
communal disintegration, massive personal and national debt, the sense that
Whatever advantage we achieve in
war is inevitable and even normalthis manner turns out to be a sham,
all indicators that we have not yet
since it is generated through the
debasement and corruption of
learned to live humbly with each
other on our lands.
each other.
The medieval monk Bernard of
Our adult world, the world
governed by ever-expanding marClairvaux, in a spiritual guidebook
kets and violent aggression, cares
called On the Steps of Humility and
nothing for this childish humility. It
Pride, said humility is "the virtue by
has been pushed aside and relegated
which a man recognizes his own
to the margins, much like Amish culunworthiness because he really
knows himself." Iris Murdoch, the
ture. Humility has been dismissed as a
"monkish virtue" that is both foolish
Bernard of Clairvaux.
late British philosopher and novelist,
and dangerous, because it impedes
Engraving by
described humility as a "selfless
progress and casts a depressing
Ambroise Tardieu.
respect for reality and one of the
shadow over human greatness. It even has been
most difficult and central of all virtues." Both of
characterized as a vice and blemish that leaches
these definitions suggest that an inflated ego is
on the strength, daring, ingenuity, and dignity
one of the prime obstacles to an honest assessthat elevate us as a species. Admonitions to
ment of our condition and place in the world. To
humility are the most miserable sign of selflive truly and faithfully with each other requires
imposed decadence, and therefore humility
that we first get this ego out of the way. And so
ought to be rejected as a character trait. Humility
Murdoch continues, "The humble man, because
strenuously pursued, on this view, eventually
he sees himself as nothing, can see other things as
will lead to self-hatred.
they are."
The trouble with this criticism is that it bears no
Many of us bristle at the thought that we are
relation to the farm scene I have been describing.
"nothing" or "unworthy." This is the kind of talk
that leads to poor self-esteem as well as a low
Alva's granddaughter, as well as her family members that I met, showed no signs of self-hatred,
self-image. But before we dismiss these ideas out
depression, or decadence. Indeed, the beauty and
of hand, we first should consider what they mean
order of their farm, as well as its rich productivity
and why they were defended by people who
and health, suggested the opposite-a sustained
clearly were intelligent (and fairly well adjusted).
affirmation, even celebration, of the community
We also need to be attentive to how these
and place in which they lived. Rather than being a
definitions can be abused and misrepresented,
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because we know how these admonitions to
humility have been used in the past to keep
individuals and groups-most notably women
and slaves-down.
When considering humility, context is literally everything. Bernard's articulation of the
issue was firmly rooted in his understanding of
persons as creatures made by God. His immediate concern was how we, whether monastic or
not, can live honestly with each other and in
ways that promote peace and neighborliness (his
treatise is peppered throughout with calls for us
to become merciful and gentle). Why is this a
main concern?
Bernard is convinced that it is possible, even
likely, for us to forget who we are. When he, and
other spiritual writers like him, suggest that we
are unworthy and nothing, he is pointing us to an
unarguable fact: that we did not bring ourselves
into being and so must depend on others (human
and non-human) for nearly every aspect of our
living. This is what it means to be a creature.
Whatever life we enjoy is finally a gift given by a
creator God. As creatures, our most important
task is gratefully to receive and share the gifts of
life, nutrition, photosynthesis, friendship-all
graciously given, and to a large extent beyond
our comprehension and control. In our conversation on the farm, Paul made it abundantly clear:
the work he and his family does is inspired by
and in response to God's prior generosity and
care for them.
Depending on one's frame of mind, this can
be a hard truth to accept. We like to think we are
self-reliant, dependent on few others, the captains and purchasers of our own fate. Indeed,
many of us have difficulty accepting the generosity of others. We feel humiliated acknowledging
that we need another's help. But when we forget
that we are creatures, and start to think we can
live "on our own terms" and experience the
world "on demand," then it is likely that discord
and aggression will reign in our communities as
people jockey for position and power and that
destruction will mark our places as we consume
the world to death. In our forgetting of who we
are, we lose the basis and starting point for a life
of care and peace namely that we all depend on
each other for the requirements of life and so

must work to strengthen and celebrate the bonds
that nurture and sustain us.
Humility is central for Bernard, because it
reflects an understanding of how we are so richly
benefited by the unfathomable generosity-what
spiritual writers term "grace"- of our creator.
Why is God so generous and hospitable to us (but
not only us)? We don't rightly know, other than to
say that the bounty, beauty, and diversity of creation, its preciousness, reflects a God who surely
loves creation and takes delight in its well-being.
If creation is the concrete, physical manifestation of a creator's love, then we plainly can see
how damaging any form of hatred is. The selfloathing often associated with humility, and the
idea that humility renders us utterly worthless, is
entirely out of place, since it represents a denial of
what God already has proclaimed worthy of love
and care. If God loves creation, thinks it worthy of
being made, who are we to say that any member
of it is deserving of our contempt or abuse?
In the smiling face of Alva's granddaughter,
the sense of the goodness of creation, the sense
that she is lovingly well-provided for, was
unmistakable. The manner in which she carried
herself communicated supreme trust in the
world. Her countenance showed no fear or suspicion, but rather delight and contentment. The
thought that if she is to live well she must take
the world by cunning and force, or that to be worthy she must first become a celebrity, had not yet
entered her mind.
Bernard was clearly aware that fear and distrust can quickly overwhelm our living. After all, it
is a terrifying thing to come to terms with the fact
that at the core of our being we finally must trust in
the kindness of others, or live the faith that God
will provide. We cannot live humbly and well
alone. We need the encouragement of each other to
sustain us in the ways of fidelity and hope. When
worry and faithlessness do take over, however, our
inclination is to deny that we are creatures made to
live in interdependent wholeness, and so we try to
secure as much for ourselves as possible. We then
become sinful and proud, defensive and arrogant,
envious and anxious, claiming more than we properly should. And so creation and communities,
rather than being at peace, unravel and begin to fall
apart through mutual contention.

It is remarkable how ecological Bernard's

ambition. The world exists to serve us rather than,
understanding of humility is. His appreciation for
as Bernard would have said, to praise God. The
creation as an interdependent whole lines up
value of things is increasingly measured by their
utility or economic benefit. The sense that our natfairly precisely with the scientific understanding
that by ourselves we are quite literally nothing.
ural world is holy or an iconic realm of deep mysThe peculiarly modem invention of persons as
tery and sanctity pointing beyond itself to someself-standing, disembodied egos is, in fact, a danthing higher is mostly gone.
gerous delusion. Insofar as we breathe and eat, it
How did we come to this conclusion? Clearly,
is only because of vast webs of energy that interthis is a very complex matter, but Murdoch gives
sect through us and everything else. To live
us a context with some clues. "We are not isolated
responsibly in a place, most obviously through
free choosers, monarchs of all we survey, but
our bodies but also intentionally with our minds,
benighted creatures sunk in a reality whose nature
we must honor and nurture our life-giving comwe are constantly and overwhelmingly tempted to
munities. One of the cleardeform by fantasy."
est signs that we have
Murdoch is suggesting
At root our problem is that
entered a path of humility
that at root our problem
we
do
not
care
to
live
ordinary
is that we pause to enuis that we do not care to
merate with some regulive ordinary lives. We
lives. We prefer the excitement
prefer the excitement and
larity all the gifts that feed
and possible grandeur offancy.
into and form our being,
possible grandeur of
fancy. Our yearning for
and then express genuine
Our yearning for another life, a
another life, a "better,"
gratitude. It is hardly sur"better,"
more
luxurious,
more luxurious, comfortprising, then, that Sabbath
worship and celebration
able, and safe world,
comfortable, and safe world,
serves as the high point of
would not be so great a
would not be so great a problem
an Amish week.
problem if it did not have
if
it
did
not
have
such
If we fail at this humsuch destructive effects.
The humble person
ble task of thanksgiving
destructive effects.
and instead choose paths
confronts this yearning
of self-glorification, comhead-on by encouraging
munal disintegration will be the result. What
us to start our thinking and evaluation where we
Bernard could not have known is how in a technoin fact are, here and now. A moment's selflogical age, combined with immense mechanical
reflection ought to reveal to us how frequently
power, the orders of creation that hold all life
we start somewhere else, a place that is definitely
together would come apart. He likely would connot ordinary but glamorous and dramatic. Rather
sider our blasted mountains, degraded coral reefs,
than beginning with an honest assessment of
depleted oceans, vanishing forests, disintegrating
who and where we are, and thus learning to work
families, anxious and stress-ridden workforce, and
within our limits and potential, we despise oururban and rural slums as the clearest signs that in
selves and our homes. No doubt various forms of
media and marketing have a lot to do with this,
our culture sin has taken a firm hold.
When we understand that in terms of ourselves
since they encourage us to treat the present with
contempt and as beneath what we deserve.
we really are nothing, the possibility emerges,
Such contempt, besides being immensely
says Murdoch, that we will "see other things as
destructive, is finally a lie. Everything we need to
they are." This point's significance cannot be overlive well is here, provided we take the time to
estimated, particularly since we now live in a
world that has been profaned on multiple levels.
nurture and care for it. Our longing to be someBy its profanation I mean that reality-forests,
where else, and the thought it will be better there,
is a fanciful delusion because it does not apprecifarms, wetlands, neighborhoods, whole townsnow signifies an idolatrous reflection of our own
ate the silliness of its starting premise: if the place
10 Ill The Cresset Lent I 2007

where I am is irredeemably boring and ordinary,
then finally every place by my being in it must
finally appear as similarly boring and ordinary.
Fanciful projection, besides inducing a neverending state of homelessness, becomes a recipe
for perpetual ingratitude and unceasing (often
destructive) competition and consumption.
To be caught in a fanciful world is to see reality
as we want to see it, not as it in fact is. When we
become arrogant, we go one step further and
believe that reality should become as we want it. As
we all know, there can be considerable distance
between these two worlds, the world of our dreams
and the world of contingent creation. As our history
so plainly shows, the preferred means for bridging
the distance has been to unleash a stream of force
and violence upon places and communities.
The violence cannot end until we rightfully
take our place as creatures, not as lords over creation but as responsible members within it. To
accomplish this aim, we will need to get our
ambition, but also our fear and anxiety, out of the
line of sight. We must, again, become nothing so
that others and we ourselves can appear in all their
freshness and wonder, all their costly grace. In
this respect, we must become again as little
children who have not yet learned to see reality
primarily in terms of an agenda. Only then will
magnificent and at times incomprehensible
beauty shine through.

There is a paradox at the heart of humility: to
achieve the fullest, most honest, affirmation of
life, we must first practice the discipline of selfdenial. Failing such self-restraint and self-control,
the wonder of the world-its graced charactersimply will pass us by. The capacity to be at peace
in our communities and places will evaporate.
Rowan Williams, the current Archbishop of
Canterbury, perceptively has noted, "The hardest
thing in the world is to be where we are." We
want to be the center of the world, rather than
take our humble and peaceful place within it.
Failing that, we yearn for another world, all the
while destroying the one we currently occupy.
For many, perhaps most, of us, Williams's observation is undoubtedly true. But not, I suspect, for
the Amish girl I met in Ontario. Will she continue
to be a witness to the serenity and contentment of
humility as she becomes an adult? I can hardly
know for certain. But I do think she is better positioned than many of us, because she lives within
a culture that takes humility seriously as the
acknowledgement that everything we have and
are is finally a gift that must be treated with
respect and received in gratitude. f

Norman Wirzba teaches Philosophy and Theology at
Georgetown College in Kentucky. He is the author of
The Paradise of God and Living the Sabbath.
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Why Cook Dinner?
Agnes R. Howard
moral choices, not just aesthetic preferences,
because
of their ramifications in economics,
will a person chew on a grape and still
ecology, and society.
wish to remain ignorant of the nature of
Pollan reveals how far-flung is our food chain,
that grape?" So pondered Hildegard von Bingen,
the twelfth-century mystic, suggesting that eating
how unlikely and unappetizing the path to our
plate. He takes eating-as-an-agricultural-act to
carries with it the responsibility to care about the
stuff that sustains life. We find ourselves at a
extreme if logical lengths, following his own steer
propitious moment for thinking about the nature
from feedlot to slaughter, watching com become
syrup, chilling with produce in an organic lettuce
of what we eat. A handful of provocative books
on food and eating
warehouse. His aim is
have appeared while
to help readers see that
Caitlin Flanagan. To Hell with All That: Loving
Americans are, hapthe
journey
from
and Loathing Our Inner Housewife. New
chicken to Chicken
pily, between diet
York and Boston: Little, Brown, and
fads. We have passed
McNugget is costly.
Company, 2006.
through low-fat and
Industrial food syslow-carb regimes, the
tems encourage us to
Cristina Mazzoni. The Women in God's Kitchen:
latter contemning the
forget or ignore where
Cooking, Eating, and Spiritual Writing. New
stuff on which most
food originates: "[l]f
York and London: Continuum, 2005.
we could see what lies
people in the world
survive, like rice, potaon the far side of the
Michael Pollan. The Omnivore's Dilemma: A
increasingly high walls
toes, beans, pasta, even
Natural History of Four Meals. New York:
of our industrial agrithe staff of life itself.
Penguin, 2006.
While there legiticulture, we would
mately may be holy
surely change the way
indifference to foodwe eat."
contentment to subsist on locusts and honey-it
Pollan is keen to distinguish heroes from villains. Com tops the list of the latter. In the rogues'
also can seem a species of ingratitude to take our
gallery are agribusiness giants that produce it,
food for granted, caring about it only on the level
farm lobbies that ensure its subsidies, and conof taste or nourishment.
fined animal feeding operations (CAFOs) that feed
Michael Pollan, a self-proclaimed "food detecanimals not naturally disposed to eat it. On the
tive," takes up Hildegard's challenge in The
side of the angels are local produce, grass-fed aniOmnivore 's Dilemma: A Natural History of Four
Meals. The dilemma is this: the abundance and
mals, small-batch cheeses, foods eaten simply as
they are. Organic products and their distributors
variety of American food, plus violent swings in
dietary fashion and the absence of long culinary
fall into a grey area in Pollan's accounting, virtutraditions, leave us unsure of what to eat. If, in
ous in intentions and pesticide avoidance, but
Alexander Schmemann's terms, "the whole world
almost inevitably compromised by large-scale
is presented as one all-embracing banquet table
industry and mass marketing.
for man," Pollan is troubled to discover that we litAlthough some readers might recoil from the
faintest whiff of moralizing about food, Pollan is
erally do not know any longer what will nourish
and what will kill us. For him, food choices are
not really sanctimonious. After all, he takes his son
"T

HE VOICE OF LIFE AND SALVATION SAYS: WHY

to McDonald's now and then, and he is not a vegthe poor. Except this food of the poor is celebrated
etarian. For his "Perfect Meal," he shoots a wild
by people affluent and elegant enough to have
boar and pulls abalone off Pacific coastal rocks,
been to Tuscany, or at least to develop Tuscan sencompleting the feast with wood-gathered morels
sibilities. The key to success in such simple foods
and a tart filled with cherries from a neighbor's
is that you must use the highest quality ingreditree. At the end of it all, he is grateful for the
ents, a mantra repeated by the glossy cookbooks
chance "so rare in modern life, to eat in full confilling bookstore shelves: only the finest, the freshsciousness of everything involved in feeding
est, the ripest, the best.
myself: For once, I was able to pay the full karmic
This status inversion touts the food of the
price of a meal."
poor as the choicest of fare, provided that rules
Preparation for that single meal sprawls over
are obeyed and exact materials are employed to
weeks. While the author knows we usually do not
good effect. In another wrinkle, the same kind of
cook that way, his admission
cooks who tout local ingredipoints to a weakness of the
ents make us covet the proThe same kind of
book. The few meals we see him
duce of someplace else across
eat are so thought- and laborthe globe. Globalization
cooks who tout local
intensive that they virtually disbreeds food envy. To make a
ingredients make us
able every day cooking. The
dish the right way, you have
cook's participation in the omnito be using keffir lime leaves
covet the produce of
vore's dilemma comes with difor powdered sumac or curly
someplace else across
ficulty. It is especially vexing for
Treviso radicchio from a
those responsible for feeding
postage-stamp plot in norththe globe. Globalization
other people-a mother feeding
ern Italy. But surely that is at
breeds food envy.
a family, for instance. Pollan's
odds with the spirit of peasearnestness is front-loaded into
ant cuisine. Peasants may
the gathering of food, so that the
have had very fresh lettuce,
crucial link between the grocery bag (or farmzucchini, tomatoes, potatoes, because they did
market basket) and the dinner plate goes largely
not have much else. It is irregular, to say the least,
unremarked. But that is a crucial link, especially
to try recreating peasant dishes with only the
with the kinds of whole foods-low on processing,
finest ingredients. So while slow-food propopreservatives, additives-that Pollan thinks we
nents have an easy target when they revile fastshould be eating. Even if your groceries are
food consumption as gluttony, insisting on only
organic, your produce local, your meat range-fed
the finest is itself a kind of gluttony, with the
in a stress- and antibiotic-free environment, someimmoderate appetite focused on daintiness
body still has to cook it.
rather than quantity.
Pollan's farmed and hunted meals reflect the
aesthetic of the Slow Food movement, founded in
MERICANS COOK AND EAT FEWER MEALS AT
Italy in the late 1980s to counter the homogenizahome, spending more of the food budget
tion wrought by fast food and preserve regional
on meals eaten out, but show ever more
regard for their kitchens. A state-of-the-art kitchen
specialties. Slow Food chapters celebrate biodiveris a status symbol in upmarket homes, even
sity and sustainability, grow heirloom vegetables,
and host heritage barbecues. One of the delicious
though those shining enormous appliances may
ironies of American culinary culture has been its
be used rarely by their owners or anyone else.
They are the trappings of cooking as hobby. Not a
idealization of peasant food. Italian cuisine seems
particularly liable to this romantic approach, with
daily duty, but something done for fun, for therapy, to impress, on occasion, with an audience. We
many cookbooks assuming a lavishly illustrated,
don' t-you-wish-you-were-in-Tuscany model:
do it with virtuosity and all the right tools, or not
behold the elegant simplicity of bread, oil, tomaat all. A magazine page advertising a gleaming
toes, a handful of herbs. Cucina povera, the food of
"complete Viking Kitchen" names the space, sim-
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Stilleben mit Friichten, Flaschen, Broten. Francisco de Goya y Lucientes, c. 1824-1826.

ply, "Rec Room." The dream kitchen designed by
Electrolux offers even more: "It's an art studio. It's
a quiet table for two. It's a clubhouse." A high-end
British oven manufacturer presents its product in
aspirational, inspirational terms, noting "Aga is
not just an appliance, it's a way of life," for "serious
cooks, celebrities, even royalty in Europe."
With such high standards for food and
kitchens, we might feel that unless we cook something authentic, organic, beautiful every day, there
is no sense in going through the trouble. That is
why households maintain a stack of takeout
menus. Why not say, as Caitlin Flanagan does in
the title of her book, to hell with all that? Why do
the work, peeling this, chopping that, with a pile of
pots and pans and plates at the end-day after
day? Why waste time cooking a dinner that just
will be eaten, or worse, just messed with, when
your kids would rather go to McDonald's anyway?
Flanagan riles feminists and traditionalists
alike, though probably the former more acutely. To
Hell with All That: Loving and Loathing Our Inner
Housewife draws on previously published essays to
praise the vanished ideal of competent house-

wifery. Recalling her own mother, she shares what
a good thing it was to have someone to clip
coupons, put fresh cookies in the jar, be waiting
when children came home from school, and be
waiting again with dinner on the table when husband came home from work. In Flanagan's
accounting, these are things to be desired now but
not necessarily to do. We might wish we lived like
this, but insofar as it requires somebody to be the
housewife, we are not willing to sacrifice talents,
education, or salary for it. So we wistfully honor
those things but must make do without them. Or
else we monetize them, paying someone to do
childcare, someone else to clean the house, someone else to do laundry, and perhaps someone else
(or some place else) to cook dinner. Flanagan
remembers her mother making pot roast but does
not do it much herself.
She thinks she should cook dinner. A whole
range of problems in the United States has been
chalked up to the waning of the family dinner:
obesity and other health problems, failed relationships, youthful delinquency, bad manners all
around, all because we eat out instead of in,

separately rather than together, in the car rather
ingratitude denigrates what it costs, in matter, life,
than at the table. For his part, Pollan blames capiand labor, to feed us. In contrast, good cooking is
talism, as civilized dining habits were swept away
quickening to creation, receiving the given with
by "the food industry's need to sell a well-fed popgratitude and ingenuity to make something flavorful and nourishing, out of it. Some days we eat low
ulation more food." Flanagan notes the absence of
family dinner, but is not overconcerned. She would
and might do so with contentment.
Dining together can be a great occasion of comjust as soon have her quality time in some other
form (she enjoys her children more once they learn
munity, enjoyment of abundance, delight in flavor,
to talk, so she "no longer [feels] lonely" in their
but it cannot be "only the finest'' every day. Some
company) and finds the hand-wringing misplaced
days we eat richly, and our food echoes our joy, or
over "getting some macaroni and cheese into the
worship, or love. On feast days we should have oil
kids." Further, she points
and fatness, sweets and
out, quite appropriately,
abundance, and it should
Vegetarians may reasonably
that one reason family dinbe food that takes special
disagree} but animals and plants
time to prepare. Even so,
ners slide in affluent
we can recognize an occahouseholds is that children
are given to us as food} and it is a
sional fast-food meal as a
are too busy with activities
suitable
way
to
respect
their
place
special indulgence, espeto get to the table on time,
in
the
order
of
things
to
eat
them.
cially for diners whose
and so reviving dinnerbudgets do not stretch to
time would signify a step
Cooking should give those
down, not a step up.
Tuscany. Pollan's son Isaac
creatures their due.
relishes fast food, and even
Flanagan
lauds
the food detective himself
housewifely thrift. Thrift
is an admirable quality, but it is not the most we
has warm childhood memories of McDonalds: "I
can say in esteeming the making and planning of
loved everything about fast food: the individual
meals. Cooking for a feast is easy, whether a real
portions all wrapped up like presents ... the pleasfeast or a once-a-month dinner party, when time,
ingly sequenced bite into a burger-the soft, sweet
roll, the crunchy pickle, the savory moistness of the
ingredients, and care are bountiful. Regular cookmeat." Fast food is hard not to like. Eating too much
ing requires more prudence and discipline. What
is available? How long does it keep? With what
of it, though, can distort assumptions about how
can it be combined?
food should taste. French fries, potato chips, and
Oreos please easily, but other foods might need
Rather than setting out Manichean categories
practice to appreciate. Spinach and artichokes,
that divide fast food and slow food as evil from
olives and apricots are worth trying, worth develgood, we might employ a different distinction:
oping a taste for. Cooking for children over the
between fast and feast, or better yet, between fastcourse of years is the way they learn what is good
ing, feasting, and ferial cuisine. The distinction is
to eat, where it comes from, and how it nourishes.
nicely upheld by Robert Farrar Capon, whose
quirky classic The Supper of the Lamb (Smithmark,
ADING PRACTICALLY ANYTHING ABOUT FOOD
1996) taught readers how to eke four meals for
these days can make eating seem like a
eight persons out of a single cut of lamb. Roasts
orally freighted pursuit, on grounds of
are for feasts, but "to the ferial cuisine belong all
health, aesthetics, or environmental impact.
the rest-the dishes which take a little, cut it up
Nevertheless, food perennially has carried moral,
small, and make it go a long way."
even religious, significance. Jewish and Christian
Fast food and slow food are both wrong for
traditions have set apart symbolic meals, elevated
every day. Vegetarians may reasonably disagree,
some foods, and excluded others. Yet the fact that
but animals and plants are given to us as food, and
what we eat matters does not have to be felt only in
it is a suitable way to respect their place in the order
guilt or self-righteousness, but in joy. Much attenof things to eat them. Cooking should give those
creatures their due. Waste, carelessness, excess, and
tion has been paid to fasting and asceticism in the
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lives of the saints, to pious women reputed to subsist on the Bread of Angels alone. While giving this
tradition its due, Cristina Mazzoni instead is struck
by how readily the preparation and eating of food
appeared in the writings of holy women mystics.
The Women in God 's Kitchen gathers an eclectic
group-some desert mothers from antiquity, some
medieval nuns and mystics, some modem converts and saints-around the focus on food, nourishment, and grace in their writings. Mazzoni's
characters exemplify an old reason for getting
back into the kitchen, one even better than current
economic or environmental justifications. When
done in a spirit of gratitude and charity, kitchen
work might be a vital way to serve and live out our
callings. It is a work of obedience, in Mazzoni's
words, of "conforming one's behavior to God (for
those who practice religion) or to the need of those
who depend on us."
St. Teresa of Avila knew there was a time for
penance and a time for partridge. Her nuns worried that kitchen duties distracted them from
more important pursuits like prayer and contemplation. This complaint rings familiar, though
currently expressed less in terms of godliness
than in the language of business and busy-ness.
Women have more important, more productive,
more intelligent callings than the preparation of
food. Teresa counseled, "[L]et there be no disappointment when obedience keeps you busy in
outward tasks. If it sends you to the kitchen,
remember that the Lord walks among the pots
and pans and that He will help you in inward
tasks and in outward ones too."
A task essential to the care of others, cooking
can be humble but honorable work. So pronounced Angela of Foligno, a thirteenth-century
magistra theologorum who joined the Franciscans
after the death of her family. One day while
washing lettuce, Angela was tempted by the
devil. A wily voice asked why she considered
herself worthy of her simple task. Angela
answered that she was worthy only for hell-a
dramatic reply that, Mazzoni notes, "shut the
devil up." Surely this gifted, holy woman had
better things to do with her time than rinsing grit
from leaves? In Angela's writings, Mazzoni reads
purity and security in the right attitude toward
preparing food for ourselves and other to eat.

When I was just married, I puzzled over a
question familiar to many newlyweds. What am I
going to make every night for this man to eat? I
was a decent cook already but wondered how,
practically, to do this all the time. Still, I saw daily
cooking as an effort to demonstrate competence: I
can do this; we can live well on our budget. The
moment of disenchantment carne one steamy
Virginia evening after we'd spent an afternoon
gathering blackberries from the banks around
abandoned railroad tracks. I carne horne to bake
what my husband declared was his favorite
dessert, blackberry cobbler. I mixed the berries
with sugar and lemon, stirred together a biscuit
crust, layered it all and sent it to bake. My hands
and much of the kitchen counter were stained purple. After dinner I presented the cobbler: fragrant,
gorgeously purple, sugared on top, served with a
melting scoop of vanilla ice cream, as proud as a
new bride could be.
My husband took a bite. "It has seeds," he
said.
"It has what?" I asked. This was not quite the
rapturous response I'd expected. "Of course it has
seeds. Blackberries have seeds."
"Nanaw's didn't. Nanaw took the seeds out
when she made blackberry cobbler."
I do not recall my reply, and it likely was not a
very good one. Internally I was aghast, thinking of
the sheer effort required to remove the seeds from
all that berry pulp, the sheer waste of it, and relative unimportance of that detail in light of the
glory of the finished dessert. But his point was
made. His grandmother's cobbler was the standard against which others were judged, and a
standard weighted by affection and memory.
In Margery Kempe's spiritual reflections, we
hear God favoring her with a comparison to dried
cod: "Daughter, you are obedient to my will, and
cleave as fast to me as the skin of the stockfish
sticks to man's hand when it is boiled." Margery's
piety gives Mazzoni occasion to note that:
preparation of food involves a gift of self.
As our fingers, hands, skin touch the various ingredients, getting them ready for
the pot and for the table, an impalpable
part of us-love?-cleaves to them, making cooking an intimate act of love ....

Cooking, and more commonly eating
together binds people to their loved ones,
and, in celebrating life, the breaking of
bread joins us in our shared need for both
food and one another-as the skin of a
stockfish is bound, tied fast, connected to
the hand that prepares (to eat) it."
Love clings when we cook. My grandmothers
made pirohi (the Slovak version of the better
known Polish pierogi), potatoes stuffed inside of
noodle dough, a potato dumpling, starch on
starch, the food of the poor made into something
special by the small measure of eggs, and the great
measure of labor, that could be added into it. Love
clings, in our thankfulness for what God gives, for
the way food of the earth smells, looks, tastes, and
nourishes, and for those we serve. We sometimes
eat with delight because food is made by someone
who loves us with it. Even though chafing against
mother's food is a staple of children's experience
and literature-trading away the contents of one's
lunchbox, wishing for junk food banned from
horne cupboards-the very rebellion validates the
assumption that, as Mazzoni puts it, "Mother's
food is best," and that mother would not feed it to
us if it were harmful.
Handling ingredients, preparing them for the
pot, gives greater opportunity than just eating to
ponder, observe, participate, and delight in a portion of the created order that has been given to us as
our daily bread. Foodstuffs are possessed of certain
scents, textures, flavors, properties, and we are

GroBes Stilleben mit junger Frau. Otto Scholderer.
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equipped with senses to apprehend these, to learn
what things look, smell, and feel like, what they can
do. Take the egg. Egg whites in a bowl start out as
an insipid, pitiful puddle, but by beating tum first
into seafoam, then marshmallowy mush, and then
virtual whipped cream, except unlike cream's density and velvet, this is resilient, firm, and glossy. Or
the sugar routine: fling a few spoonfuls of sugar
into a dry pan, tum on heat, and solid becomes
liquid, colorless becomes golden, then amber, then
burnt. Witness the smell of a peach at the stern end,
the coarse nap on the skin of a yellow wax bean, the
way an avalanche of spinach in a pan wilts to nearly
nothing. It is all a wonder. It is good that things are
so made and that we have the sense(s) to apprehend it. The kitchen is a place to learn, a varied education, worth having for oneself and teaching one's
children, not just in order to do but to understand.
Sor Juana Ines de la Cruz, a seventeenth-century
Mexican nun, wrote to her superiors:
Well, and what then shall I tell you, my
Lady of the secrets of nature that I have
learned while cooking? I observe that an
egg becomes solid and cooks in butter or
oil, and on the contrary that it dissolves in
sugar syrup.... It was well put by
Lupercio Leonardo that one can philosophize quite well while preparing supper. I
often say, when I make these little observations, "Had Aristotle cooked, he would
have written a great deal more."
Mazzoni's women find nobility within the
humility of the kitchen. But there is
lowly, and then there is lowly.
Flanagan contests the vein of feminism that characterizes cooking as
"dogwork" or worse, quoting Joan
Didion's quip, "To make an omelet,
you need not only those broken eggs
but someone 'oppressed' to break
them." This characterization looks
frankly boorish when set against the
kitchen arts that women across the
world master: handmade pasta
rolled silken, curries made with
spices fresh-ground and yogurt
home-cultured, dark loaves baked
from yeast conjured out of the air,

fruit pies with lattice tops and scalloped edges.
Flanagan's audience, even those among them who
personally would never peel a carrot, has been
taught by food magazines and celebrity chefs to
appreciate these. Still, it is hard to square contempt for kitchen work with appreciation of good
food; desire for healthful, unprocessed meat and
produce with inability to cook it; thrift with overrarified tastes. Cooking is quite appropriately seen
as an art. Though to see it only as art is to forget
the human need that drives it-to imagine
Babette's Feast as just a display of virtuosity.
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Flanagan's lays a heavy burden on the
mother trying to feed her family. The whole
weight of environmental pollution, cruelty to animals, energy politics, the side effects of fossil fuels,
if not the whole global economy, plus the health of
her family, bear down on her whenever she
reaches for a package of boneless, skinless chicken
breasts. Her family might reasonably assume that
if the cook picked and prepared something, it
must be worth eating. Mother is gatekeeper, point
of contact between the marketing and the eating of
food. But she has ads and slogans ringing in her
ears begging her to grant imprimatur to things
that may not be worth eating, or promising too
much that what is convenient for her is also good
for them. There is a voluminous social science literature on American women as consumers, from
nineteenth-century advice manuals to college
majors in home economics, to advertising campaigns teaching moms to combine housewifery
with convenience.
Here thrift alone fails us. At the end of the day,
literally, thrift is insufficient rationale for taking
the high road. When dinner needs to be on the
table, drive-through, take-out, and pre-made are
nearly irresistible. Grocery shopping might be
simple if you have unlimited cash or no concern
about how and where food is gotten or its consequences for health, but buying within the limits
suggested by all three categories is hard. It is
harder still with toddlers hanging off the side of
the cart, for whom none of those categories apply.
In fact, buying without those limits would be the
way a toddler, left to himself, would go through
the aisles, hardly something to aspire to. Caitlin

Flanagan contrasts starkly with her mother's
housewifery, confessing, "child of my time, I could
not tell you the price of a single item in my refrigerator. All I know- from long, unpleasant precedent-is that much of it is going bad and headed
for the trash can."
But if we view Pollan's book through the lens
of Mazzoni's subjects, we find fresh incentive to
the daily task of feeding a family. From Mazzoni
comes warm appreciation of the love and loveliness of food well prepared; from Pollan, stiff medicine on the broad consequences of one's eating. So
the family cook does something of environmental
and economic import when she buys food, and
something of beauty and fidelity when she prepares and serves it. It is better to know something
about what one eats, because we should wonder,
even be frankly amazed, at the grapes we have to
chew on. The work is not too menial for the very
busy or very educated, nor is it predominantly for
show or showing-off.
In this encouraging vein come cookbooks
with titles like Weeknight Meals, Everyday Mexican,
or Everyday Italian. Even Martha Stewart, with her
peerless ability to beautify and complexify housekeeping, now maintains both a magazine and a
PBS series titled, Everyday Food. These sources
span a range of approaches to the problem of
weeknight meals, from make-aheads reliant on
crackpot and freezer to store-bought with addons, a style the magazine Real Simple(!) calls "Fake
It Don't Make It." My favorite options would be
plainer-soup and bread, beans and rice, lightly
dressed pasta-choices perfectly acceptable if we
allow that every day is not a feast day. To cook
successfully does not require preparing "Crunchy
Wasabi-Crusted Fish with Red-Cabbage Slaw" or
"Jerk Pork Chops with Hearts of Palm Salad and
Sweet Plantains," two entries from the TenMinute Mains feature of a Gourmet magazine,
which favor luxury as a substitute for time.
Perhaps all this seems like inordinate care for
bodily necessity, time misdirected to things that so
quickly pass away. Here we might try to locate the
limits of appropriate care for what we eat. It is a
mistake to care too much, either for reasons of
taste or for environmental sensitivity, to swell
with righteousness at one's refined taste or clean
conscience. We should care for the earth but not

make a fetish of it. Nor should we make an idol of
the body: masking finitude with fitness, prostrating all to health and longevity, hoping through
high fiber and flavonoids to cheat death. We
should not be obsessed with food because either
our appetites or our consumption or both are
immoderate. And I think Pollan is wrong on this
count: we never pay the full price for what we eat,
karmic or otherwise. There are so many imponderables and unmeasurables linked even to the
simplest bites that we never really have a right to
the pride of thinking ourselves alone responsible
for what we eat. Better to think measuredly of
daily bread, and receive it with thanks.
Curiously, frequent cooking can insulate one
from errors about food rather than making one
more susceptible to them. Contact with foodstuffs exhibits the beauty and bounty of creation
but also its fallenness and one's own fallibility.
Things go wrong, collapse, burn, curdle, and
crumble. My sister executes recipes better than I

do, but she compliments me on the ability to fix
things that fall flat. It is, after all, only food.
Admittedly, cooking can still sometimes feel like
a mandala sand painting, the Buddhist art form
painstakingly rendered grain by grain and
destroyed upon completion to symbolize the
impermanence of all that exists. Costly ingredients will be consumed, used up, fill the belly, just
like common ones. Things spoil. And it is not the
object of our eternal devotion: one sees hauntingly the speed of decay, noting how quick the
time between freshness and rot. We are mortal
creatures who do not have life in ourselves but
must take in nourishment. Those of us who have
the task of feeding ourselves and others might do
so in a way that invites companionship and
thanksgiving around daily necessity. 'f

Agnes R. Howard teaches English and History at
Gordon College in Wenham, Massachusetts.

VERNA DAMEIER
Though Mrs. Jack Dameier's
Dressed in sweats and running shoes,
She can't outrun Alzheimer's,
But she does her best.
She is delighted
To meet her children:
"I imagine Jack
(Dead eight years now)
Is walking Roxy.
Don't leave, he'll want to meet you
When he gets back."
And such a vernal smile spreads
Across the soft ravines
Of her raised face,
Like forgetful grass
Brightening the weathered stones,
Like sunlight sleeping on
The shoulder of the land.

Charles Strietelmeier
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Friendship and Its Language
John von Heyking

F

RIENDSHIP IS IN BAD SHAPE. LAST YEAR THE

American Sociological Review published a
study demonstrating that between 1985 and
2004, the number of Americans admitting they
have no one with whom to discuss important
matters nearly tripled. But lacking a confidant is
only part of the crisis. Americans seem to have
lost their ability to maintain even basic neighborliness. One of the study's authors observed how
starkly Hurricane Katrina revealed the problem:
"'That image of people on roofs after Katrina resonates with me, because those people did not
know someone with a car,' said Lynn SmithLovin, a Duke University sociologist who helped
conduct the study. 'There really is less of a safety
net of close friends and confidants."' Similarly, the
New York Times recently ran an article documenting the anxiety twenty- and thirty-something
New York men feel when they spend time with
one another doing things other than watching
sports or cruising for women. The "man date,"
where two or more men enjoy conversation over
dinner and wine, is considered "too gay" for most
men, it seems.
Americans, even when not stranded on their
rooftops, seem to have lost the art of friendship.
They seem to be unsure just what to do with a
friend. They know how to unite their bodies but
not their souls. They seem to have forgotten a rich
heritage in Western thinking on the meaning of
friendship. The ancient Greeks thought that
friendship at its best involved conversing about
the noble and the good. Thus Xenophon reports
Socrates proclaiming:
Just as others are pleased by a good horse
or dog or bird, I myself am pleased to an
even higher degree by good friends ... and
the treasures of the wise men of old which
they left behind by writing them in books,
I unfold and go through them together

with my friends, and if we see something
good, we pick it out and regard it as a
great gain if we thus become useful to one
another. (Xenophon, Memorabilia, I, vi, 14)
The Greek philosophers spoke frequently about
friendship, which for them culminated in conversation about the good and noble.
The Bible mentions friendship less, but its
intermittent references are critical. For instance,
as Liz Carmichael observes in her exhaustive
Friendship: Interpreting Christian Love, notable
Christian thinkers have been drawn to John 15:15
as a central text on Christian love. There, Jesus
proclaims his disciples will no longer be
disciples, but friends.
Friendship also plays a strong role in the relationship of Adam and Eve. In Genesis chapter two,
that enigmatic "second creation story," we hear in
greater detail than chapter one what kind of world
humans are to enjoy. God gave Adam enormous
freedom in naming all his sustainers or counterparts. We share in this freedom, and awesome
responsibility, when we name our children (or
when children name their pets). But to name entire
species! Adam's ability to name presupposes that
he had an understanding of natural kinds-the
difference, say, between a dog and a cat-allowing
him to name species. It is for this reason Walter
Benjamin called Adam the first philosopher.
Whereas we had to learn the names of animal
species from our parents, Adam would have
known the stark difference between a world that is
intelligible and significant and one that is not.
Yet, the joy of learning natural kinds left Adam
incomplete. He acknowledges this incompleteness
in his first recorded speech, which happens to be a
poem (in Robert Alter's translation):
This one at last, bone of my bones
And flesh of my flesh,

This one shall be called Woman,
For from man this one was taken.
(Gen. 2:23)

not only conversation but also conversion and
dwelling with. "Citizenship," as translated by the
King James, seems too cramped.
But between our creation and our salvation,
In recent years, this passage has been read as a
how on earth are we supposed to conduct
friendly conversation in that fulsome sense?
patriarchal assertion of female bodily dependence
on male form. This passage and its subsequent
Three recent books go some way to uncovering
the reasons for friendship's current crisis, as well
narrative, with its emphasis on the unity of flesh,
frequently gets recited at weddings (although
as offering some remedies.
marriage frequently has been taken by numerous
Joseph Epstein's Friendship: An Expose, is a
Christians as the height of friendship).
chatty reflection on the contemporary state of
However, the text leads us to conclude that
friendship. He thinks people today (himself espereadings emphasizing gender inequality and marcially) either have too many friends or they are
riage do not preclude us from viewing it as a statelonely, which ends up being two effects of the
ment of Adam's noetic parsame cause. He observes that
ticipation in friendship.
modem life is so fluid that
Modern
life
is
so
fluid
that
Adam has been naming,
our friends are like our
and therefore contemplatwardrobe: just as we wear a
our friends are like our
ing, natural kinds. In copiece of clothing for a while
wardrobe: just as we wear a
and then remove it, so too we
creating with God, in makpiece of clothing for a while
interact with our friends
ing a world of signifiers for
humans, he has been exer(actually acquaintances) for a
and then remove it, so too we
few hours, but we fail to
cising reason, his highest
interact with our friends
faculty. Yet, this world of
know the whole person.
Unlike Adam, who in sizing
signifiers is not fully signif(actually acquaintances) for a
up Eve, had a pretty good
icant. Adam needs a confew
hours,
but
we
fail
to
versation partner. In Alter's
understanding of who and
what she was, we have "difliteral and musical translaknow the whole person.
tion, we hear Adam's first
ferentiated friendships" that
words (which, as his first
take in a fragment of our
words, ineluctably draw the reader into the confriends but not the whole person. Unlike Adam
who gained self-knowledge in "at last" finding
versation): "This one at last." Adam has been
Eve, our superficial encounters deprive us of selfsearching for his own kind with whom not only to
knowledge. As a result, Epstein observes that we
"go forth and multiply" in the bodily sense, but
also in its noetic sense of praising and understandtry to compensate by seeking even more friends,
ing creation. Even though he is lord of creation,
which ends up undermining our sense of friendship with any one of them. Our friendships end
Adam finds creation incomplete without someone
with whom to communicate its glory. Since Adam
up feeling like burdensome obligations. While
speaks in verse that begins and ends with the femfriendships do carry their obligations (friendship
includes justice, according to Aristotle and
inine indicative pronoun, z 'ot, "this one," we are
Aquinas), they do not necessarily feel like obligaalso given to understand that Adam understands
his own kind (human) but also the feminine that
tions. Friendship implies reciprocity, but friends
completes his maleness. That he speaks in verse
do not keep scorecards. No one proclaims "at last"
when they meet their obligations.
suggests the importance of poetry, in the sense of
Epstein is critical of some of the modes of intermusic and of stories that engage both body and
action we modems frequently mistake for the
soul, in the conversation among human beings,
including friends. Perhaps this is why, in his
essence of friendship, including intimacy, compasVulgate, Jerome translates Paul's politeuma in
sion, and confession. He also regards marriage as
its rival. Epstein provides a thumbnail definition of
heaven (Phil. 3:20) as conversatio, a term meaning
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friendship as affection, shared interests, past, values, enemies, and delight in one another's company (21). But intelligent conversation is his focus,
and telling stories about friendship is more important to understanding it than philosophical
theories. Citing political philosopher Michael
Oakeshott, Epstein finds friendship "dramatic,"
meaning our experience of it is inescapably participatory (45). He does not think friends need to share
belief in God (20), by which he seems to reject a
central definition of friendship (of Cicero, and
shared with Augustine) as "agreement on things
human and divine combined with goodwill and
love." However, Epstein insists that friendship
depends on having in common "certain unspoken
assumptions about what is and what isn't important" (38). The ability of friends not to have to
worry about debating the fundamentals of their
common worlds places friendship "beyond intimacy," which enables them never to "run out of
things to talk about or run out of good feelings for
each other" (115). If friendship begins with respecting another's dignity, g~tting "beyond intimacy"
entails reaching their (vaguely defined) "central
fire," which ensures community (163). Friendship
involves speech, but it is beyond speech. Epstein's
understanding of friendship is closer to that of
Cicero and Augustine than he lets on.
Epstein tries to be countercultural in criticizing our democratic demand that friends be equal.
Quoting Francis Bacon, equality produces rivalry
about which unequal friends need not worry:
Achilles and Patroclus, Johnson and Boswell, Don
Quixote and Sancho Panza, and so forth. One
could add Socrates and his friends, and recall that
while Jesus preferred friend to disciple, only He is
the Son of God. Epstein prizes his own friendship
with the sociologist, the late Edward Shils, who
was older and whom Epstein regards his intellectual superior. Epstein became Shils's friend after
Shils and his equal, novelist Saul Bellow, broke off
their friendship. Even so, the way Epstein
describes his relationship suggests Shils regarded
Epstein-despite inequalities in age, learning, and
experience-his equal in having "a nearly complete understanding of his motives and his reasoning and, finally, the meaning of his life" (31). At
last, Shils may have proclaimed in sizing up
Epstein, he has found this one.

Stephen Miller's Conversation: A History of a
Declining Art provides a history of conversation
and shows the philosophical and cultural sources
of the contemporary crisis in friendship. He identifies two broad enemies of conversation, and
therefore of friendship: (1) the active life, which
explains why the American founders were not
good conversationalists (they were too busy
founding their republic), and the obstacles commercial life places on it (too busy forging utilitarian relations); and (2) various forms of enthusiasm, which historically took the form of the Holy
Spirit in Christianity and its parallel in the
Romantic cult of authenticity, according to which
nonverbal gestures convey one's essential
humanity more adequately than verbal gestures.
Examples of authenticity include Jean-Jacques
Rousseau's symbol of natural man, which was
inspired in part by his contempt for the conversationalists of French court life, Ernest
Hemingway's laconic heroes, the nihilism of
1960s counterculture and its belief that authentic
humanity comes through LSD and sex, the proclivity of rock stars and rappers who rely exclusively on vulgarities to express their sincerity
about whatever it is they are sincere about, and,
finally, the cult of individualism, whose devotion
to expressing one's "unique point of view"
diminishes conversation into a series of "intersecting monologues."
Miller's conversationalist defenders of friendship are the "clubbable men" of the English and
Scottish Enlightenment: Adam Smith, David
Hume, Samuel Johnson, and Jonathan Swift. The
pubs, clubs, and coffee shops of London and
Glasgow were the seedbeds of liberty and
Enlightenment because such men were spirited
conversationalists whose discussions covered the
breadth of human experience. They surpassed the
universities as sources of innovative thought.
Their participants were more serious about their
conversations than the French courtiers, who,
according to English and Scots, were more interested in playing verbal games than in engaging in
serious discussion (though Montaigne and La
Rochefoucauld earn praise for their insights).
Yet, for all of Miller's criticisms of antiintellectualism, he admits that reason alone does
not make for good conversation. Raillery, which

Swift called "the finest part of Conversation,"
keeps conversations both serious and ongoing.
Raillery involves teasing, testing, antagonizing,
and even making temporary enemies out of one's
conversation partners (5). For Epstein, and likely
for Miller, raillery is more characteristic of male
conversations (when they bother to converse) than
it is of females. Even so, it has a way of cementing
attention toward one's friend and to the topic of
the conversation.
Miller sees raillery as a key index of how politically stable a country is: "how much its citizens
can engage in good-humored disagreement" (308).
However, raillery shares with conversation's
prominent enemies, the active life and authenticity. Like one committed to action, raillery demands
assertiveness and risking that one's plans will
come to naught. In conversation, raillery tests the
other's manly appetite for defending and asserting
one's viewpoints, thereby risking enmity with
one's partner. Like authenticity, raillery asserts
one's personality.
For the ancient Greeks (whose raillery, especially that of Socrates, Miller overlooks, although
he summarizes the more docile parts of their conversational skills), raillery is an expression of thumos, the spirited part of the soul. Thumos gets
aroused when one is compelled to defend oneself
and those one loves, as well as one's viewpoints. It
enables political life. For Aristotle, it is the source of
friendship and enmity (he and Epstein observe that
one hates most those one previously has loved). As
a result, it needs to be harnessed by reason so those
two faculties of soul can perfect each other.
With Epstein and Miller, we find friendship
sustained when reason rules the soul but also participates with what is above reason ("beyond intimacy," "central fire") and what is below reason
(thumos). Liz Carmichael's study of the central
place of friendship in Christian love shows how
this stretching out reaches its most differentiated
expression in the Christian Trinity.
Carmichael laments that Christians have not
sufficiently availed themselves of the New
Testament friendship teaching. Her book covers the
variety of ways Christian thinkers through the centuries have nevertheless drawn from John 15:15.
While their neglect has numerous sources (monasticism being a major one), she points to the
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Lutheran theologian Anders Nygren's study Agape
and Eros, published in the 1930s, as having a
corrosive effect on Christian understandings of
friendship in the twentieth-century. For Nygren,
friendship is antithetical to Christian love, because
it is too self-interested. Carmichael's study of
friendship in the Christian tradition disputes that
claim in a number of ways, including the equation
of caritas and friendship in the writings of Aquinas
and in modem personalist accounts of the Trinity.
For Aquinas, "in the love of friendship, a
man's affection goes out from itself simply"
(114-16, referring to Summa Theologiae 1-11.28).
Friendship as conversatio mimics the divine communicatio of God giving Himself to Himself. In ST
1-11.38.2, Aquinas precisely formulates this communicatio: "But the Holy Ghost receives his proper
name from the fact that He proceeds from Father
to Son. Therefore Gift is the proper name of the
Holy Ghost." From this, one may infer that naming has something to do with friendship, that is,
love and understanding a "who" in addition to a
"what." Aquinas develops a set of symbols showing how we can get into that conversation.
Paradoxically, we cannot strictly speaking get
into that conversation. Friendship has no starting
point in the sense that our affection for a friend
precedes our recognizing that affection: "the
appetible object [i.e., one's friend] gives the
appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which
consists in complacency in that object; and from
this follows movement toward the appetible
object. For the appetitive movement is circular"
(ST 1-11.26.2). In more familiar language, this
means God's love for us enables our love for Him,
but it also points to the mystery of friendship
according to which we necessarily find ourselves
loving our friend before we recognize it. The
appearance of our friend impresses his form onto
us, which "complacency" (complacentia, the pleasure we experience in adapting our love toward the
beloved) moves the appetite to desire union,
which gets experienced as joy when achieved.
Adam would have experienced "complacency"
when he beheld Eve "at last."
Aquinas says we experience uniting with our
friends as "mutual indwelling" (mutua inhaesio).
We are "in" each other insofar as we have
impressed our form on one another's soul-on

-

I
opened up a path into a wholly new exploration of
intellect and on appetitive power. We know we are
human inter-subjectivity" (159). Modem personal"in" each other when we delight in one another.
ism, expressed variously by Kierkegaard, Simone
We also know we are "in" each other when we
Weil, and others, is more faithful to the Trinity
"strive to gain an intimate knowledge of everythan Aquinas, for whom one still "looks up" and
thing pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate
thereby emphasizes God the Father, rather than
into his very soul" and where "it seems as though
"looking down" to the Son. For personalists,
he felt the good or suffered the evil in the person
friendship is expressed through those concrete
of his friend" (ST I-11.28.2). Aquinas's insertion of
encounters with individual and particular per"it seems" indicates that the identity of friends is
sons. "Who" takes full precedence over "what," or
imperfect, or more precisely, they are both identiin Martin Buber's terms, our friend is a "Thou" not
cal and different, and enough of each to allow for
an "it." In preserving the
meaningful conversatio. The
Christian obligation to love
desire for complete identity
Augustine observed that
one's fellow human being,
is in principle antithetical to
our neighbor is he who "by
personalist thinkers have
the practice of friendship,
developed a variety of ways
which, involving people
chance" is nearby. Our lives
to express a fundamental
sharing a common story,
and
our
friendships
are
stance with which we face
allows each individual to
formed
by
the
manner
in
"the
Other."
write his own lines in
Kierkegaard
distinresponse to the other.
which we respond to our
guishes
between
"finding
Friends
also
suffer
chance encounters) whose
the perfect person in order
ecstasy and zeal toward one
to love him" from the
another. Ecstasy literally
meaning only becomes
Christian ideal of ''being the
means being taken out of our
apparent as we live out our
perfect person who boundplace. It is what we experilessly loves the person he
ence by having our friend's
lives with those friends.
sees" (159). John Burnaby
form impressed upon us, our
affection going out of us simconsiders
the
Good
Samaritan as the paradigmatic human encounter,
ply, experienced as delight in him and the desire to
where particular love is governed by the condiprovide him his good, for his own sake. Jesus tells
tion of need itself (165); Simone Weil considered
us the consummate act of friendship is to lay down
our life for them (John 15:13). Zeal expresses what
that "creative attention" requires us to transcend
love shares with thumos: "the more intensely a
our need of seeking our good and to experience "a
power tends to anything, the more vigorously it
miraculous supernatural transcendence which
withstands opposition or resistance" (ST I-II.28.4).
enables us to 'wish autonomy to be preserved' in
We love what helps our friend and hate what
ourself and the other" (170). Finally, all these
thinkers insist on the irreplaceability of persons
harms him, including external harm as well as vice.
Twentieth-century critics distinguished
(175). These personalist accounts seem to share an
appreciation that human beings do not choose
friendship from agape by insisting only the former
is self-emptying. However, Carmichael's analysis
their friends so much as find them along the paths
of Aquinas shows how they missed the mark
they take, and that those paths are ineluctably
because she shows how, for Aquinas, selfformed by the chance encounters with our
emptying and sharing depends on maintaining a
friends. This insight recalls Augustine's observasense of self. Implicitly, by seeing friendship as
tion, made in On Christian Doctrine, that our
falling short, these critics ask too little of agape.
neighbor is he who "by chance" is nearby. Our
However, Carmichael believes Aquinas did
lives and our friendships are formed by the mannot go as far as modem thinkers in explicating the
ner in which we respond to our chance encounters, whose meaning only becomes apparent as
friendship of the Trinity. While the modem age
invented the isolated individual, it also "thereby
we live out our lives with those friends.

In some ways Carmichael overstates the novelty of the modern turn toward personalism. It can
already be found in Aquinas, as well as in
Augustine (as Peter Burnell has recently demonstrated). Moreover, behind the modern language
of personhood, one can find Kantian notions of
dignity and its assertion of autonomy, which in
many ways conflicts with Trinitarian love. What
can be gained by examining the modern turn
toward personalism, however, is its reflections on
the differing modes of encounter that chance
brings about, and how those modes express our
friend's irreplaceability. Each friendship encounter
is experienced as a unique event. Yet, we share a
latent though rarely understood humanity that is
drawn out in those unique encounters. Some postmodern formulations (which celebrate chance)
make friendship nearly impossible because they
deny another self for one to love and understand,
as well as one loving and understanding. While
postmodernism's skepticism toward a stable self
in many ways contributes to Miller's observation
that contemporary conversations are in fact "intersecting monologues," Epstein's common-sense
experience of friendship with Edward Shils,
whose life's meaning Epstein divined, shows postmodernism goes too far in its skepticism.
Rather, personalism reminds us that friendship reveals itself in its concrete practices and
iterations. Their descriptions of how friends connect with one another are vaguer than the delicately paradoxical language Aquinas uses to
describe "mutual indwelling." This vagueness
may be due to the isolation modern individuals
experience, reflecting ambivalence as to how two
souls unite. For Aquinas, friends mutually inhere
with one another with their affection and with
their intellects. With their intellects, we seem
noetically to touch on a mysterious inner core or
"central fire" (Epstein), but also through the more
day-to-day encounters we describe to one
another in a more reflective mode. The noetic and
the reflective are inseparable.
Epstein rightly alerts us to the importance of
stories about friends (35). Stories are the way the
reflective part of our intellects participates with
our friends. We share stories with our friends
while simultaneously writing those stories with
them. It always seems that after friends finish per26127 The Cresset Lent I 2007

forming some action, like backpacking in the
Canadian Rockies, they feel the need to talk about
it, frequently over drinks. Stories express and are
examples of individuals participating with one
another in a grander whole. Aristotle alludes to
this when he writes: "And elsewhere Odysseus
says that this is the best pastime, when human
beings are enjoying good cheer and 'the banqueters seated in order throughout the hall listen
to a singer."' (Politics 1338a28-30, quoting Odyssey,
9.5-6). Ancient and Christian thinkers like
Augustine frequently compared the aspired-to
harmony of a city to a story or poem, and some of
our best statesmen have been good story-tellers.
Abraham Lincoln and Winston Churchill were
great storytellers. Churchill's ability to tell stories
was prodigious (many to Franklin Roosevelt, who
frequently lacked the energy, and later the desire,
to listen to them all), and he also wrote numerous
books chronicling England's "island story." Lesser
statesmen write only memoirs, but even these
begin as stories they tell those around them.
Storytelling seems implied in Aquinas's evocation of the names of the Trinity because those
names are of persons, that is, of relations of entities
that are neither species nor particular instances (ST
1.20). It seems also the lesson to draw from Adam's
first recorded speech, which was a poem inviting
us into the drama of humanity. However, the fluidity of modern life is a profound obstacle to our ability to live these stories with one another. We share
chapters, sentences, a few fragmentary clauses, but
the story as a whole is elusive.
Because stories seem difficult to share, people,
out of lonely desperation, frequently seek a shortcut into the "central fire." Out of loneliness, the
ecstasy and zeal about which Aquinas speaks gets
deformed into erotic excitement, as well as the
variations of Romantic authenticity Miller discusses. Zeal, unhinged from reason, gets
expressed as rage and the sullenness of the lonely
individual in the mob. Yet, Epstein points to the
noetic vision of his friend Shils at the poignant
moment when they both recognized they understood each other. That is the moment when their
stories, their personalities, reveal themselves as a
whole, an experience similar to witnessing the climax of a play. Many of us have had those
moments of recognition (or had experiences we

thought were such moments-a mistake
frequently causing confusion and heartache).
For the most part, though, we settle for intimations of such wholeness, which usually
expresses itself in our desire for our friend's
physical presence. Epstein and Miller speak of
the special importance of physical proximity
with friends. Gestures, eye contact, and simply
sitting nearby not only amplify verbal meanings
in conversation but also embody the human
world in which speech is made: Adam had to see
Eve; Aquinas notes the proper name for the member of the Trinity that was born is "Son." We frequently think of physical presence as an embodiment or instantiation of something greater (like
the body serving as the instrument of the soul).
Conversely, physical presence evokes wholeness,
shorthand for a complete story. Churchill liked to
have face-to-face dealings with foreign leaders,
because it afforded each party an opportunity to
stake his honor and to demonstrate their understanding of each other. Similarly, Elizabeth Telfer
notes that liking someone (the prelude to loving
them) is a matter of sizing them up, seeing if, like
a painting, they "hang together" well in a unity.
But we never fully see their unity because theirs
is never fully present even to them and ours is
never fully present even to us.

The challenge of friendship then is to find a
way to articulate the possibility for mutual
indwelling in its appetitive, noetic (experiencing
the "central fire"), and reflective modes (stories) in
a way that acknowledges the limits of how modern man can remedy his isolation. Nostalgic
yearning for a communitarian and rural past is
inadequate and even dangerous. Such an attempt
needs also to acknowledge that modern man
seems to like a good part of his isolation, his unsociable sociability as Kant said, because that preserves his autonomy. Yet, is not the point of friendship to balance autonomy and love for another?
Or is the virtue teaching of Aristotle and Aquinas
irreducibly different than Kantian ethics? Does
autonomy require that we stay well away from
our friend's "central fire" lest we get burned? Kant
cited this as one of the reasons he considered
friendship a "minor virtue" and why it plays a relatively insignificant role in his moral thinking. The
ethical state is governed by rules, not by friendships. Yet friendship is more humanly satisfying
than rules and obligations. For this reason friendship will remain a central aspiration, if a problematic one, in our lives. ;John von Heyking is Associate Professor of Political
Science at the University of Lethbridge.
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Pondering Conscience
Civil Disobedience in American Law
and Same-Sex Dissent in the ELCA

Marie Failinger

T

HE CONFLICT OVER MARRIAGE RIGHTS FOR GAY

and lesbian couples seems destined to be
one of the key defining fault lines for both
the mainline Christian churches and American
government in this early part of the twenty-first
century. Despite pleas from church leaders,
including Mark Hanson, much of the polity of
mainline Protestant churches, including the ELCA,
the Episcopal Church USA, the United Methodist
Church, and others have been sharply divided
over the issue.
The issue of same-sex marriage remains both
contentious and politically important. Same-sex
marriage proponents recently achieved legislative
or court victories in Massachusetts and in New
Jersey, which in December 2006 joined
Connecticut and Vermont in recognizing civil
unions. However, these proponents suffered
defeats in seven other state elections, where voters
adopted state constitutional bans against same-sex
marriage, as well as civil union "equivalents" in
some states. The legislative and court battles in the
states on this issue are far from over. In
Massachusetts, Gov. Mitt Romney has asked voters to override the legislature's decision not to act
on a same-sex marriage ban, while California's
high court has agreed to hear a lower court decision upholding such a ban.
The fact that there are now two different sets
of marriage laws in the United States, and that
many other traditionally Christian countries from
Spain to Canada now recognize same-sex unions,
poses two difficult questions for mainline
Protestant churches. First, these denominations
will have to decide how they should respond to
legally married same-sex couples as well as those
joined in civil unions. Even if voters ultimately
overturn court decisions or laws recognizing
same-sex relationships, many same-sex couples
already will be married or joined in civil unions,
and there would be serious constitutional prob28129 The Cresset Lent I 2007

lems with invalidating already legally recognized
relationships.
Lutherans, along with other Reformation
churches, traditionally have insisted that marriage
is not a sacramental institution but an ordering of
the "left-hand governance" to be defined and regulated by the state. In many states, legally married
or joined gay and lesbian members can now make
a more plausible claim that their marriages should
be blessed by the church. The fact that they are
legally joined would seem to shift the burden to
opponents to argue why the state's marriage law is
so fundamentally contrary to the Word of God
that the church should refuse to recognize the
state's authority to join these couples. Of course,
the distinction between marriage and civil unions
might play a role in such arguments, though it is
not yet clear why it would for Reformation
churches that traditionally have left the definition
of marriage to the secular authorities. Moreover,
the mainline ban on ordination of gay and lesbian
pastors in non-marital intimate relationships rests
in part on the argument that they are a "stumbling
block" or scandal to other believers. That argument loses some of its force if gay and lesbian pastors, duly married or joined in civil unions, live in
chaste and faithful relationships.
Conversely, the success of state constitutional
bans and court cases turning back claims of samesex marriage proponents in other jurisdictions
poses perhaps an even more difficult dilemma that
will be the focus of this essay: How should
Reformation churches like the ELCA respond to
"faithful dissenters" who argue, in conscience, that
their congregations must recognize and bless
legally unrecognized same-sex unions, or call gay
and lesbian ministers in committed relationships?
Though American churches increasingly have
looked to American legal models to govern the life
of the church, I will suggest that the current
American constitutional model for responding to

"conscientious dissenters" is a very inapt model
for Lutheran churches struggling with these
issues, because it does not take seriously Lutheran
understandings of the relationship between the
state, the conscience, and the believer. In particular, American constitutional doctrine on religious
dissenters does not accept four "Lutheran" community responsibilities: to acknowledge the dissenter, to submit ourselves to the lordship of
Christ, to adopt the Other as a sister or brother in
Christ, and to risk on behalf of the neighbor.
Indeed, were I a member of the Supreme Court, I
might suggest that the Court has something to
learn from Lutheran teachings about how it treats
religious dissenters, even though religious and
legal models for responding to dissent would
surely look different, given the different roles
these "orders" play.
Dissent in the Church
It is tempting to borrow from American constitutional doctrine to think about religious dissenters in the church, especially given the increasing tum in the ELCA toward a political model in
the resolution of theological disputes. Following
the distinction employed by University of Chicago
law professor Cass Sunstein and others in the legal
academy, the ELCA's decision making process
often appears, at least from the outside, to resemble a pluralist or "democratic" process in which
like-minded persons achieve victory for their
interests or views of churchwide policy by forming coalitions and lobbying for a majority vote for
their position in congregational, synodical, and
churchwide assemblies. Examples of the adoption
of the American political and legal model in ELCA
decision-making include the convention floor
protest over the anti-same-sex blessing position at
the 2005 ELCA Churchwide Assembly, reminiscent of 1960s American political protests and
ELCA disciplinary processes that strongly resemble the American secular "due process" model
employed in criminal prosecutions and civil deprivations of public benefits.
Sunstein contrasts the pluralist or "democratic" governance model with a "republican"
style of governance, in which decision-makers set
aside their own agendas and come together to reason about the common good. While the "republi-

can" model has been encouraged by drafters of the
ELCA's sexuality studies, it is far from clear that
ELCA congregations and political alliances on
either side of the issue are willing to commit themselves to having it decided through a shared
process of reasoning and prayer in which participants trust that God will participate with them in
discerning God's will for the world.
Perhaps it is not such a surprise that American
democratic processes have so thoroughly influenced the church. While there are many ways in
which one could still distinguish American
democracy from Lutheran and other Reformation
church polities, it is possible to overstate this difference. For example, it is not true that the ELCA
is the kind of theologically homogeneous body of
believers that would make a "republican" model
work easily. This reality struck home when I was
reading my local newspaper's spotlight on one
believer, who told the reporter that he believed if
he were a good person in this life, he would go to
heaven. His congregation was Lutheran. In both
ethnically Lutheran communities and those where
Lutheran congregations are growing quickly,
many congregants will live their daily lives using
theologies markedly different from core Lutheran
doctrines on grace and works, the two kingdoms,
natural law, or Scriptural interpretation, foundational ideas that are key to determining one's position on same-sex marriage. Their views and votes
are likely to be informed as much by upbringing
and social and political beliefs as by theology.
In such an increasingly "American" church
body, characterized by religious and theological
diversity and borrowing from American political
and legal norms in church governance, it is important to ask whether the "American model" of protecting dissenters through constitutional judicial
review is instructive for the church in the "blessing
and rostering" controversy.
Dissent in the American Constitutional Tradition
In describing such an "American model," it is
certainly difficult to categorize the wide variety of
court cases that have arisen under the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, the predominant American vehicle for protecting dissenting
religious minorities. However, at least two streams
of conscientious objection to mainstream political

decisions emerge. One category of Free Exercise
cases involves traditional civil disobedience: in
these cases, religious claimants attempt to "raise
the consciousness" of the wider culture about a
perverse systemic flaw in American political or
social life that, in those disobedients' view, threatens the moral structure of American society.
In the past half-century, the paradigm for
these traditional disobedience cases before the federal courts is derived from the claims of pacifists
like Elliot Welsh that war is fundamentally wrong,
or selective pacifists like the Catholic Guy Porter
Gillette who refuse to participate in unjust wars.
They have been joined by other resisters who have
hammered silos or sat in government buildings or
poured blood on government documents to protest
American acquisition of nuclear weapons or complicity in unjust military actions in places like El
Salvador. The 1980's Sanctuary movement that
smuggled Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees
into the U.S., revived today in humanitarian efforts
by groups like No More Deaths on the ArizonaMexico border, is a similar form of Free Exercise
civil disobedience cases. Indeed, some of the
Court's recent Establishment Clause cases are
essentially minority religious protests against the
encroachment of majoritarian Christian religion on
public life. Deborah Weisman's protest against
school-sponsored prayer at graduation, Daniel
Donnelly's attack on Pawtucket's Christmas display, and Michael Newdow's challenge to the
"under God" language in the Pledge of Allegiance
are some examples.
A second, much larger set of Free Exercise
cases might be termed, for lack of a better word,
"governing indifference" cases. In these cases, religious minorities ask the courts for protection
against the government's failure to notice that religious minorities' spiritual practices are different
from those of mainstream Christians or secularists, or sometimes, to welcome and accommodate
those differences. For example, traditional Sunday
closing laws or unemployment compensation
laws expecting workers to be available on
Saturdays reflected the majority's obliviousness to
the fact that Jews and Sabbatarians rest and worship on Saturdays. Yet, even when minorities
pointed out the burden of these laws on their worship and rest obligations, many states were reluc30131 The Cresset Lent I 2007

tant to change their rules to permit these minorities to meet their religious obligations. Jews have
the same struggle with military uniform requirements and meat slaughtering regulations, while
Native American church members fought a long
and only partially successful battle to protect their
right to partake of their sacrament, peyote. The
Amish and many conservative Christians who
have asked for waivers from compulsory public
school requirements similarly have had to tum to
the courts to protect their right to educate their
children as their conscience demands.
Acknowledging Dissent in the Church
Same-sex "blessing and rostering" advocates
in the ELCA make both "civil disobedience" and
"governing indifference" arguments to the church.
At a most fundamental level, gay and lesbian
members of the church are asking other members
to notice and then welcome their difference, rather
than ignoring or trying to hide the sexual diversity
in their congregations. They protest that, when
their sexual difference comes out into the open, the
church is expressing indifference to the great loneliness and pain it asks them to suffer in order to
meet its demand that they refrain from sexually
intimate, loving, and faithful relationship with
another person.
But in essence, ''blessing and rostering" dissenters are also making moral claims against the
fundamental presumptions of the Church community about which human beings and relationships
are worthy. Although they sometimes dress up
these claims in the inapt (in my view) language of
rights and autonomy, at bottom these dissenters
are rebuking the church for not taking seriously the
fact that God has made them too in His image, that
they are a good creation even down to the way in
which their sexuality is bestowed on them.
Moreover, in Lutheran terms, they essentially contend that their own efforts to live out of grace on
behalf of the neighbor, including in intimate relationships, are not only disrespected but treated as a
leprous sore upon the church and society.
Just as peace protesters rail at how the U.S. uses
war to claim political and moral superiority and
advance American economic self-interest, so ''blessing and rostering" advocates essentially argue that
the church elevates heterosexuals and their nuclear

Submission to Christ's Lordship
family relationships as morally and religiously
Church conflicts over differences in consuperior to all other forms of neighbor-love.
science also require submission to the lordship of
However, "blessing and rostering" dissenters
Christ. Lutheran Christians are called to do more
should not be quick to tum to an American demothan simply "see difference"; they are called to
cratic model for relief. The Supreme Court's modreflect on how difference poses a challenge to the
em response to both "conscientious objection" or
ways in which we all justify ourselves and our
"indifference" claims by religious minorities
lives at the expense of the suffering of others. In
leaves much to be desired as a model for Lutheran
acknowledging the challenge that minorities in the
Christians. At least since 1990, when Employment
state or the church pose to those of us who live
Division v. Smith was decided, the Court essentially
"acceptable lives" by majority standards, we begin
has affirmed the legal right of the political majorto give up our pretensions that our own lives are
ity to be completely indifferent to the needs of relithe measure of good. Instead, we come to recoggious minorities. In the Smith and the Church of
nize the ways in which
Lukumi Babalu Aye cases,
God's surprising and often
while the Court signaled that
The first moment in
disruptive grace upends
it was willing to protect reliLutheran
communities'
how we justify and prefer
gious minorities hostilely
response to conscientious
our own natures and lives.
targeted for their faith under
the Free Exercise Clause, it
We give over the power to
dissent should surely be to
announce judgment and
acknowledged the right of
acknowledge both the dissent
forgiveness to our Lord.
democratic polities to pass
and
the
dissenter
in
a
way
Seen through Lutheran
"neutral and generally applieyes, the contemporary
cable" laws that make it diffithat respects difference as a
Court's construction of relicult or impossible for religift of the creation, albeit
gious minority claims of
gious minorities to practice
a
corruptible
one.
conscience is perverse,
their beliefs. Thus, religious
because it fails to acknowlminorities have to seek help
from state or local legislatures to protect their
edge the essential communal ties between religious
forms of worship as well as their daily religious
majorities and minorities. In the imagination of
obligations. These constitutional decisions, which
many of the justices, religious minorities are not "of
us," but are-to tum a well-known Latter-day
purport to protect majoritarian democracy, simply
encourage democratic majorities to slide back into
Saints phrase on its head-a "peculiar people." In
their old habits of ignoring religious difference.
the justices' most benign readings, religious dissenters are like the quaintly odd Amish, who mind
Lutheran theology, it seems to me, asks for
their own business and only ask for a small accomquite the converse from church communities. The
modation for their faith from the state. In other jusfirst moment in Lutheran communities' response
tices' darker imaginations, religious dissenters are
to conscientious dissent should surely be to
social non-conformists with the temerity to ask for
acknowledge both the dissent and the dissenter in
special privileges for themselves. Justice Antonin
a way that respects difference as a gift of the creScalia mocks them for thinking that they are "a law
ation, albeit a corruptible one. Refusing to give
religious minorities their day in court simply
unto themselves" who owe no responsibility to
masks the existence of conflict over conscience.
their community (or, in the church's case, to the
demands of the text) for the damage that their nonSimilarly, attempting to quell blessing and rostering dissent in the church by arguing that all matconforming behavior might cause.
In this American legal construction, religious
ters of sexual behavior are conclusively settled by
dissenters are "other than us," the oddity or excepthe biblical text for time and eternity papers over a
diversity of conscience that should be acknowltion set apart from the "regular American" whose
values and behaviors guide social life. Martha
edged as a gift of the creation, mysterious as it
may be to figure out.
Minow has written compellingly of ways in which

majorities measure minorities from their own
Adopting the Radically Other
standpoint, failing to acknowledge the implicit
In responding to conscientious dissent in the
norms by which such "peculiar people" are judged,
church, Lutherans must also affirm our adoption of
and the colored perspective from which the majorthe radically Other as a brother or sister in Christ, in
ity looks down on minorities as odd, wrong, perstark contrast to the Supreme Court's position on
verse, or irrelevant to social life. Moreover, she
this question. Even the Court's most "liberal" Free
argues, such judgments on minorities embrace the
Exercise opinion, the 1963 Sherbert v. Verner case,
assumption that the status quo is "natural, uncowhich examines whether the state has a compelling
erced, and good," and thus an objectively fair staninterest to override the consciences of religious
dard to judge the Other rather than a partial, conminorities, does not go this far. While the Sherbert
structed standard by which we use our own prefercase (now overruled by Smith) requires the state to
ences to condemn and feel superior to others. A
consider seriously whether its objectives are imporjudgment of this sort by any other name is sin, our
tant and whether it has respected, as much as posfailure to acknowledge our own attempts at lordsible, the religious difference of the other, it continship over the other, rather than the lordship that
ues to assume that the religious dissenter is an "outgoverns our lives.
sider" for whom the
Lutheran doctrine simiAmerican people owe no
The life of the churchlarly demands that we honresponsibility except freeespecially a church that is
estly and humbly recognize
dom. That is, the most a
the consequences of our own
religious dissenter can
asking for such great sacrifice
creatureliness, from the sin
gain under Sherbert is
on the part of some of its
that infects all our attempts at
what the Founders called
members-must acknowledge
judgment to the finitude that
"toleration," the right to be
makes our evaluation of the
left alone. Yet, the notion
the human needs of those
Other's conscience and life
of toleration, while supewithout families and spouses,
necessarily faulty and incomrior to suppression or even
plete. And, it seems to me,
not only conindifference,
needs that do not disappear
repentance for our attempts
tinues to assume that the
because one is gay
to establish our positions as
majority's stance is supearbiters of God's will also
rior
and
that
any
or single or old.
demands
that
straight
"deviance" is "tolerated"
Christians "walk in the
only
because
of
shoes" of gay and lesbian Christians who are forced
Americans' preference for freedom. Toleration also
to make painful choices between obeying the
puts the religious dissenter at arm's length from the
demands of their faith community and sharing
political majority, requiring no affirmative responsibility for the dissenting Other and confining the
human physical intimacy. I often have wanted to
challenge straight, married Christians who rail
scope of dissent that will be permitted.
against same-sex marriage to give up physical
As Christians have used the word adoption as
affection and intimate relations with their partners
a metaphor to describe their entrance into the community of Christ, by contrast, they speak of the willfor a year or two so they know truly what they are
asking of gay and lesbian Christians in the name of
ing embrace of God for the Other in a lifelong relaGod and the church. The very least such Christians
tionship that cannot be broken by disagreement
over politics or even moral behavior. As descriptive
can do, it seems to me, is to listen with an open
of Christians' relationship with each other, adopheart to the stories of gay and lesbian Christians,
tion is a commitment to a person as person, not an
indeed to every single story, and to walk with them
as real partners through the tragically lonely path
assent to his or her beliefs, character, or even life
the church calls them to follow, rather than interchoices. It is a commitment to engage those beliefs,
rupting their stories with condemnation and beatcharacter, and life choices without threatening to
disrupt
the relationship unless the chasm proves
ing them with Bible verses.
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much too deep. It is a commitment to faithfulness in
moments of conflict as well as in moments of
estrangement. And yet, adoption signals a responsibility assented to, as much internally embraced in
the Christian's heart with joy as imposed from the
outside by the church's moral teaching. It is a commitment to a stranger, a person whose biology is
not shared, whose life story does not parallel the
adopter's, who by definition is fully other.
This call to adoption of the Other, it seems to
me, is the call that Bishop Hanson and others are
making to both sides in the same-sex marriage controversy. Or, to use the ELCA task force's metaphor,
it is a "journey together" under the call of a theology that quite simply and powerfully acknowledges that every person is a sinner, and that our salvation does not depend on either our family structure or our sexuality. It is a call for nothing less; neither the right to exclude one another literally or figuratively from the "true church," nor simply tolerance of each other's difference, but rather a life-long
embrace. And it is a call to adopt each other not
only in word but in deed. The life of the churchespecially a church that is asking for such great sacrifice on the part of some of its members-must
acknowledge the human needs of those without
families and spouses, needs that do not disappear
because one is gay or single or old. It must reorganize itself to live for the neighbor who comes to the
church with those needs, without becoming simply
a faux-family. If the church is so focused on glorifying and preserving the nuclear family that all of
those who have much more critical needs for love,
affection, and belonging are to be left by the wayside, the church becomes simply a part of the world,
not a challenge to it.
Risking on Behalf of Neighbors
This commitment, it seems to me, requires the
church to bear a risk with respect to dissenters that
our government has been unwilling to bear.
American "conscientious disobedients" - those
religious dissenters who insist that American society confront its deepest sins, whether of violence
or indifference to human need- receive even less
solicitude in the federal courts than those who are
simply asking to be left alone. For example, those
who have trespassed upon federal property in
protest of nuclear weapons or American foreign

policy, or who have violated the law to save
human lives at our borders, have met with no constitutional sympathy in the courts even when they
have rested upon a claim of religious conscience.
This hardened stance by the courts against
"conscientious objectors" is justified by the serious
threat such disobedients supposedly pose to the
rule of law. As Justice Scalia describes it, if we
allow civil disobedients to break the law, there is
no principled way that we can impose the law on
others with less benign motives, thus creating
anarchy where no person feels the need to obey
the law. Because their claims threaten both the
authority and equal enforcement of the law in this
view, their attempts to expose the corruption of
the law are shunted aside, and they are told that
their proper recourse is to convince the majority to
change the law. And, of course, the disobedient
replies, "I wouldn't be here if the legislature had
examined the moral propriety of sending arms to
the brutal regime of El Salvador or passing a law
that the homeless cannot sleep on the streets." At
bottom, the Court's reception of disobedient& suggests that it is not willing to embrace the risk their
plea poses to the rule of law any more than the
executive or legislative branches who also refuse
them a hearing.
By contrast, Lutherans, certainly, are called to
risk everything, including the comfort of authority
and security, for the neighbor. We cannot forget
that Luther meant this almost literally, exhorting
Christians to risk their very lives against the
plague in order to minister to the neighbor. This
demand is not only that majorities see the anguish
and need of minorities in the Church; it is a
demand, as well, that minorities in the Church risk
the censure and conflict that come with encounter
of their neighbors who disagree with them. It
demands that each Christian and each political
collective respond not first with self-justification
or condescension to the Other's attempt to witness
to the truth of the Word as he understands it, but
in willing service to the neighbor's need and in
invitation to that neighbor's own story. Risk
means, of course, that the church may get it wrong,
even wrong in terms of "truth" and the "common
good" of the church. But to refuse to risk everything except the Gospel itself for the neighbor, his
soul as well as his life on this earth, is to refuse to

trust a promise that transcends any mistakes we
may make in biblical interpretation or in moral
discernment. f
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mUSIC

The Got Dang Song
J.D. Buhl

T

HERE MUST HAVE BEEN A SIGH OF RELIEF FROM

music writers everywhere when the 2006
Grammy Award nominations were
announced on December 7. Among the bizarre,
the bland, the expected, and the inexplicable,
"alternative-mainstream" singer-songwriter John
Mayer earned five: one for Try, his first album
with the John Mayer Trio (Rock Album of the
Year), and another for Continuum, his third solo
release, up for Album of the Year.
Thankfully missing from December's mentions was Continuum's "Waiting On the World to
Change," the chart-topping call-and-response
single that many feared would be a shoe-in for
Song of the Year. It seems that even the clueless
enthusiasts of the Recording Academy recognize
that the song is problematic, at best.
"This song's lyrics frustrate me!" wrote
"nmaiello" in September. In one of many Internet
exchanges over the would-be anthem, the writer
went on to say,
John says that our generation is misunderstood, that it seems our generation doesn't
care what's happening in the world, when
in fact we are highly concerned. However,
he holds up the problems in the world and
government as excuses for people to "wait
on the world to change,'' instead of taking
action and making change! The song falls
short of its potential and ends up just
being pop, not protest.
That's the gist of it, but my discomfort with
the song runs deeper. I found a kindred listener
in "no_one" who shares my belief that there is
something disingenuous in the song's very form.
"No_one" wrote (sic):
When i first listened to it, i [thought] it
must be a redo of an old Curtis Mayfield

and the Impressions number from the
late sixties, something like "People Get
Ready." The song certainly follows in that
tradition of beautiful, haunting, politically conscious community music ...
work located in trying to change the
world and create a better day for people
who suffer in the community.... and that
whole black tradition of utilizing slick
streetwise phrases as social prophecy
and community righteousness, shaping
them around a beautiful melody in an
extended act of orature, so the message of
the lines, the "slogan,'' becomes memorable, something to go and change the
world with once the artist's "call" is
responded to in antiphonal response by
the listener.

Y

ES, THE SONG IS ALL THAT, FROM ITS OPENING

"me and all my friends, we're all misunderstood I they say we stand for nothing
and there's no way we ever could," to its final
assurance that "one day our generation is gonna
rule the population." But it's got no soul. Caught
up in the groove, one may be fooled into thinking
there's a real call to which a listener can respond.
Co-opting Curtis Mayfield to lend authenticity to
his in-activism, Mayer's message is not just
charmingly ironic, it's down-right dishonest. Or,
as "no_one" put it, "the refrain 'waiting on the
world to change' ain't engaged politically enough
for me."
Back when "me and all my friends" were
waiting for the world to change, "Curtis" (as he
was affectionately referred to) was coming into
his own. And so was the next level of soul music.
Mayfield's later work with the Impressions had
provided the soundtrack for the civil rights
movement. As the singing-group leaders of the
1960s became the solo artists of the 1970s, he was

more responsible than Martin Luther King, Jr., for
the proliferation of white boys hanging posters of
black men on their walls, or at least Mayfield,
along with a few football players, was responsible.
By 1972, eleven of that year's twenty-one
Number One hits were by African-American
artists; ten of the forty-nine albums rated A- or
above by Robert Christgau that year were from
R&B singers. Al Green had become the supreme
Soul Man, the Staple Singers were taking us
there, and a kid m y age from Gary, Indiana, was
beginning his long day's journey into weirdness
with a movie-song sung to a rat named Ben. So
with the release of Superfly, I got off the Grand
Funk Railroad and found a new musical hero in
Curtis Mayfield.
The soundtrack to a blaxploitation movie,
Superfly used all of Curtis's sweetness, but stung
like tears in your eyes. The undercutting irony
and sorrow of the album's lyrics seem remarkable now. To have gotten away with them at the
height of the self-devouring commercialization of
Black Power seems almost incredible. I couldn't
have appreciated it then, but now I admire his
courage.
Superfly is the soul classic, the work that will
appear on "Greatest" lists in perpetuity. One year
earlier, Mayfield had released his third solo
album, Curtis/Live. Here is the soul of the man, a
recording so full of warmth, humor, personality,
and purpose that it still feels like it was recorded
at the Bitter End last week. It is here that you will
find the grooves Mayer mines for "Waiting": a little "People Get Ready," a little "We're a Winner."
Mayer does not respond, however, to Curtis's call
to "check out your mind." In this definitive version of "We People Who Are Darker Than Blue,"
Curtis sweetly urges, "don't let us stand
around .. . and let what others say come true."
Elsewhere he breaks into a spontaneous, "I
believe!" "I'm here to say," Mayfield tells his
audience, "that I believe we'll make it some daysho 'nuff." It's not clear Mayer believes in anything other than his got dang song-and getting
another on the airwaves as this one's moment
wanes.
it's hard to be of assistance
when we're standing at a distance
36137 The Cresset Lent I 2007

so we keep waiting
waiting on the world to change
Curtis Mayfield would not think waiting is
cool. Outdoor stage scaffolding fell on the singer
in a windstorm in 1990. Using a wheelchair and
paralyzed from the neck down, he was forced to
wait five years before cutting what would be his
final album. With no diaphragm, Curtis let gravity put pressure on his lungs, cutting the vocals
for New World Order in 1996 flat on his back. His
message of equality and acceptance remained the
same as he came to represent another sector of its
inclusivity- paraplegics.
The man dubbed "black music's most unflagging civil rights champion" by critic Nelson
George died in 1999.
Mayer portrays his generation of twentysomethings as already flagged and championing
nothing. "Now if we had the power," he sings;
Mayfield would tell him you have the power. "We
see everything that's going wrong with the world
and those who lead it," Mayer assures us; Mayfield
would tell him you do have the means to rise
above and beat it. "It's not that we don't care,"
Mayer insists, "we just know that the fight ain't
fair"; "Never stopped me," Curtis would say.
On New World Order, Curtis sang "The Got
Dang Song," one of those cheery calypso-beat
numbers about oppression that major dudes can
pull off. There the voices of victims world-wide"standing at the bottom of the totem pole, carrying the weight for every got dang soul"-respond
with stinging sarcasm to Mayer and Generation
Wait: "Some folk say to suck it up I Ain't got no
straw, ain't got no cup."
George wrote in The Death of Rhythm & Blues
(1988) that "like a true nonviolent civil rights
activist, Mayfield looked for the best in antagonists as well as friends, gently prodding for
change and rarely pointing an accusatory finger
in anger." Perhaps no finger should be pointed
now. Mayfield and his generation certainly had
manners; they knew their please and thank-yous.
But wait for permission to change the world?
Lord, no.
"'Wait' has almost always meant 'never,"'
Martin Luther King, Jr., wrote in his letter from
the Birmingham jail. Mayer's defensive optimism

may be good for a song or two, but Mayfield
made a career out of a sincere concern for his fellow human beings, remembering what Dr. King
told him: "History is the long and tragic story of
the fact that privileged groups seldom give up
their privileges voluntarily." So Mayer and his
friends can wait as long as they want. The world

ain't gonna change until they decide that "wait"
will never again mean "never." f

J.D. Buhl teaches reading and writing at Queen of All
Saints School in Concord, California.

PSALM 137
Jerusalem the rivers here are not like your rivers.
We weep into them, and our tears float over the sluggish surface like drops of oil.
Jerusalem we tried to chant the old songs,
but could not even remember the shapes of our houses
although we dream of them every night. Our instruments hung
under the poplars, untouched. There, by the river,
the villagers asked us to sing, but we could not
remember the color of the dust once caked on our feet.
How can we sing the songs of the Lord wading in their muddy grasses?
What music in their harsh language?
Jerusalem I am already forgetting you. My hands shake when I touch my harp.
Jerusalem I hate the way they pronounce your name. Jerusalem
if my accent ever changes, let my tongue rot in my mouth.
Jerusalem I won't forget the smell of burning foundations.
Jerusalem sometimes I want to break everything in the house:
every one of the new water jugs, the legs of my Babylonian husband,
the arms of his first wife. And 0 God,
even her babies playing in the yard
might split open like pomegranates.

Hannah Faith Notess

film
Luther-A Reluctant Movie
Conrad Ostwalt

T

HE HIGH POINT OF MANY UNIVERSITY COURSES

on Christian history occurs with the story of
Martin Luther-students are riveted by the
intrigue. A reluctant reformer perhaps, Luther
accepted the responsibilities thrust upon him
when events surrounding his protests veered out
of control. As a result, this reluctant priest's mission led him to take a brave stance at a crucial
moment in Christian and Protestant history.
Luther's reluctance did not prevent him from
becoming heroic; it propelled him toward greatness. Sadly, the same cannot be said of the movie,
Luther. The movie's reluctance fully to embrace
and explore the uncertainties surrounding
Luther's life prevents it from achieving greatness,
but only barely. Given the monumental task of
portraying the life of Luther; the tumultuous political struggles involving Empire, nation, and
church; and the lofty yet corrupt ideals of the sixteenth-century church in a mere two hours, director Eric Till has managed a fine and entertaining
movie about Martin Luther, disproving the ageold student protest that history is boring.
Always with films about historical figures, one
of the most pressing questions concerns how true
the film is to the events as history understands
them. Similarly with this film, one could debate,
question, and analyze the historicity of the story,
but this would be largely fruitless. One could
debate whether Luther actually posted his 95
Theses on the door of the church in Wittenberg or
whether he really said, "Here I stand" at Worms.
But such elements have to be part of the filmic
telling of Luther's story whether they are historical
or legendary, because these and other episodes are
so much part of the myth that defines Luther that
they are indispensable to the story. Like good
myth, these dramatic elements define the truth of
Luther's story whether they are historical or not.
One could also debate the historicity of elements of
the story such as Luther's relationship to Hanna,
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the peasant, or to the events surrounding his relationship to Katharina von Bora. Suffice it to say
that Till and the screenplay are largely faithful to
the recognized biography of Martin Luther, and
the small liberties taken with the story are of little
consequence to the plot. The movie faithfully represents the life of Luther up to the point of his marriage and the Augsburg Confession. Because this
period covers some twenty-five years of the most
tumultuous history in Europe, the film by necessity
omits too many crucial contextual scenes and
events. Thus, its historicity is impaired more from
omission than misrepresentation. Finally, perhaps
the greatest nod to historical importance comes
with the film's visual sophistication. Beautifully
filmed with impressive on-location sites, settings,
and intricate costuming, this movie is visually
gratifying and educational.
The plot highlights include some of the major
events in Luther's early life. The film opens with
Luther cowering in an open field, terrified by the
lightning storm that turned his life toward God.
The scene is not only effective in setting the biographical context, but also in setting the stage for
the life of Luther, a life filled with lightning strikes,
near misses, and thunderous upheaval. Luther's
demanding father, tormented confessions, struggles with Satan, and trip to Rome are likewise
treated early in the film as seminal moments in
Luther's character and development. However,
virtually all of these scenes gloss over the importance these moments had in shaping Luther, and
the viewer gets only a bare hint at Luther as a
struggling young man, who is unsure, anxiety
laden, and depressed. As the movie continues, the
familiar elements of the history unfold: Pope Leo
X and his effort to raise money for St. Peter's
Basilica; John Tetzel's indulgence peddling;
Luther's posting of the 95 Theses; Luther's summons to Augsburg; the role of Prince Frederick the
Wise; the climactic clash of empire, nation, and

church at Worms; Luther's exile and his translation
of the New Testament into German; the Peasant
Revolt; Luther's marriage to Katharina von Bora;
and the Augsburg Confession. It's all there, more
or less where it should be, but for viewers without
a pretty solid grounding in the history of the
period, it would be difficult to appreciate fully the
personal, religious, socio-economic, and political
turmoil that gave the Lutheran episode its worldaltering impetus. Rather than depth, the movie
settles for synopsis, stringing together a series of
important events hoping the viewer does not
notice crucial omissions and concluding that the
Luther story paved the way for religious freedom
with scarcely a critical thought allowed for the role
of Luther and the events surrounding him.

T

HIS LACK OF DEPTH EXTENDS TO LUTHER'S OWN

characterization and leads to the greatest
flaw of the movie. While Fiennes does an
admirable job of portraying the doubt Luther felt,
he is constrained by the screenplay that does not
allow him to plumb the depth of pain-emotional and physical-that beset Luther. What
made Luther great was not his heroism or his
genius; rather, it was his ability to overcome the
great depth of depression and anxiety that
defined his life and to adopt a public persona that
captivated thousands, instilled faith, and was
strong enough to stand alone before, even
against, emperor and church. Fiennes is perhaps
at his best when he portrays Luther lecturing to a
class with the charismatic humor and irreverence
that added to the reformer's popularity. But he
has little opportunity to develop Luther's pain.
Besides a singular mention of his "bowels" and
another of being "depressed," the best glimpse
we get of the man's turmoil comes with a couple
of scenes where Luther argues with Satan. One of
these scenes, the evening between his successive
public appearances at Worms, is particularly successful and is the closest Fiennes comes to portraying Luther's angst. But the performance falls
flat in the next scene when Fiennes delivers the
climactic speech of Luther at Worms. When
Fiennes quotes the defining words, whether legendary or historical, "Here I stand. I can do no
other," his Luther seems to be saying these words
more from resignation of his fate than from the

obsessive conviction that defined the man. The
scene disappoints; it is anti-climactic and antiheroic.
This avoidance of Luther's psychological and
physical pain as seminal to his development is
symptomatic of the film's deficient treatment of
Luther's complexity. The film avoids Luther's possible shortcomings, obsessive behavior, crude language, and sometimes blunt assessments of
others. Luther's harsh words against the peasant
rebels are avoided; his egoism unexplored; his
equivocations about domestic life not even hinted
at in his relationship with Katharina. His weaknesses removed, Luther appears all redeeming. In
contrast, Luther's enemies have no redeeming
qualities. They are reduced to evil foils to prop up
Luther's virtue. As a result, Luther comes off too
"good looking," even appearing twentyish as a
forty-two-year-old bridegroom. The film borders
on hagiography through its characterization of
Luther and by reducing most other characters to
play the villain or a supportive role to the great
reformer. An example here is the sentimental
appearance of the peasant Hanna and her child,
whom Luther befriends and supports. His
sympathetic demeanor toward the pair contrasts
sharply with other church officials who exploit the
peasants, as dramatized when Hanna purchases
an indulgence for her child. When Luther finds the
child's abandoned crutches in the rubbish following the massacre of peasants, he is moved by the
tragedy. The whole episode magnifies Luther's
virtue in contrast to the unscrupulous ecclesia and
the murderous civil authorities. However, the film
does not explore Luther's own vituperative works
in support of the civil authorities' efforts to
suppress the peasant revolt.
Characterization in the movie then is flawed,
reducing Luther's humanity by focusing only on
his virtuous qualities, and diminishing other characters by making them props or foils or by focusing only on their sordid character. Pope Leo X is
portrayed as a one-dimensional, delusional power
broker intent on slaying the "wild boar" of the
church. There is one exception here. Sir Peter
Ustinov masterfully portrays Prince Frederick.
Ustinov brings humanity, believability, and
humor to the role of Frederick. Ustinov's Frederick
is the only one of the protagonists who grasps

fully the political realities of the drama, and
Ustinov brings this to the forefront with brilliance.
Criticisms of the film aside, this is still a fine
movie worth seeing, both for its entertainment
and educational value. From an educational
standpoint, the film's decision to settle for
breadth at the cost of depth serves viewers well
by informing them about Luther's biography and
the Lutheran phase of the Protestant reformation
movements. The politics and human drama are
there but submerged, and the theological and
ideological intricacies are largely ignored, so it is
incumbent to come to the movie armed with
some awareness of the history. With this preparation, the film can give visual and aural bones to
this important moment in Western history. From
an entertainment standpoint, the movie is strong.
While the plot is episodic, it is nonetheless clear.
And while characters are a bit one dimensional
(except for Frederick), the acting is seasoned and
sometimes stellar (especially Ustinov, who is

brilliant). The staging and costuming are intricate
and beautifully done. And although I cannot
vouch for the period authenticity, the costuming
and appearance of the characters add realism to
the film. The result is a beautifully filmed feature
that is a visual treat.
The final scrolling appendix to the film before
the credits roll references Luther as the champion
of religious freedom, one more troubling, uncritical, and hagiographical plug for Luther and the
Protestant Reformation in general. There exists little here to suggest that Luther was the reluctant
reformer that he appears to have been, and this
movie's reluctance to take up that point prevents it
from being the great movie it might have been.•

Conrad Ostwalt is Chair of the Department of

Philosophy and Religion at Appalachian State
University and Professor of Religion and Culture.
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rerea ding old books
·Mark Twain's Life on the Mississippi
Harold K. Bush Jr.
N 1882 MARK TWAIN SET OUT ON AN EXTENSIVE
working the river and was in New Orleans in
tour of the Mississippi River Valley. It was
January of 1861 when the state of Louisiana officially seceded from the Union. He was there
Twain's first return since the Civil War to the
river scenes of his youth, and of
again in April when Fort
his triumphant steamboat
Sumter was fired upon, offipiloting years, and it included
cially beginning the war.
stops in Hannibal, St. Louis,
Almost immediately, his work
Vicksburg, and New Orleans,
on the river carne to an end, at
where he would have long viswhich time he headed back to
its with George Washington
Missouri. During June of 1861,
Cable and Joel Chandler
Sam Clemens joined briefly
Harris, author of the Uncle
with fourteen other young men
Remus tales. The journey feato form a militia unit of the
tured idle days aboard a riverMissouri State Guard, which
boat called the Gold Dust,
they dubbed the Marion
headed for New Orleans.
Rangers. During two weeks in
As the ship moved downthe stifling summer heat, they
stream, Twain experienced a
marched, trained, slept out
kind of cultural regression- a
under the stars, and generally
tried to act like actual infantry
slow, lazy drift into the outdated and thoroughly defeated
volunteers. For reasons that are
society of the South. Despite
not entirely clear, Sam left the
the languid atmosphere, he
Marion Rangers to journey out
had some hard work to do. The Original cover of Mark Twain's Life on the West with his brother Orion,
purpose of the trip was to Mississippi, first published in 1883. Recently who
recently
had
been

I
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gather interviews, anecdotes,
and news accounts of the region: its history,
geography, and the social and cultural conditions
after the war. Specifically, the trip was meant to
trigger a revision of his "Old Times" river
sketches, which had appeared in the Atlantic
Monthly in 1875. Those sketches would form the
heart of the volume that became Life on the
Mississippi, published in 1883.
Among other things, this underrated book
has much to tell us about the American Civil War.
Perhaps it is not surprising that this extended trip
down memory lane would jar Twain's imagination back to the days when he, if ever so briefly,
had his own firsthand experiences with the
spread of secession fever. Young Sam had been

appointed secretary of the territorial government of Nevada.
For twenty years, Twain never said much
about this brief experience in the Missouri State
Guard, ostensibly protecting the state from the
threat of invasion. Perhaps he was hesitant
because of the possibility of being charged as a
deserter. But in the 1880s, reflection on the War of
Secession suddenly became a personal obsession-and a national one as well.
On his 1882 voyage, Twain was struck by the
effects of the war on the culture and society he was
inspecting. The memories of actual survivors of
Civil War battles in such locations as Vicksburg
brought Twain face to face with some of the most
brutal tales of the war. Those tales are recalled, for

example, in chapter thirty-five of Life on the
Mississippi, entitled "Vicksburg during the
Trouble." The frequent bombardment of the city
would result in "frantic women and children scurrying from home and bed toward the cave dungeons-encouraged by the humorous grim soldiery, who shout 'Rats, to your holes! ' and laugh."
The war tales were certainly tragic enough,
but ultimately Twain learned much more about
the prolonged, ravaging fallout of the war in the
land of his youth, and how deeply it had penetrated the southern economy and culture. The
book energized much more thinking about the
war's effects. In fact, the trip back down the river
in 1882 also played a crucial role in the completion of his other key writings (directly or indirectly) about the Civil War: Adventures of
Huckleberry Finn and "A Private History of a
Campaign that Failed." Although these works
treat many other topics, they go together well
because of their common examination of
"America's religious war," as Mark Noll and
others have lately been calling the Civil War. In
particular, these texts critique the myths and
ideologies at the heart of the Confederate cause.
They also provide inspired analysis of the
changes that took hold in the South in the aftermath of the war, which contrasted so significantly with growth and progress in the north,
especially New England and New York.
The title of the volume under consideration
here, Life on the Mississippi, is suggestive of the
book's sociological content. The regional changes
that Twain witnessed after more than twenty
years were even more striking than he could have
imagined, and he was both delighted and dismayed by what he found. He wrote to his wife
Livy, "That world which I knew in its blossoming
youth is old and bowed and melancholy, now; its
soft cheeks are leathery and wrinkled, the fire is
gone out in its eyes, and the spring from its step."
One metaphor of this slow demise was the
chief vehicle of the river, the steamboats. The bottom of the river south of St. Louis was littered
with the buried hulks of sunken steamboats-a
ghostly legacy of both the river's untamable natural powers and of the war years. Viewing the
dead ships was a poignant reminder of Twain's
own heroic days as a pilot. This image of the
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wrecked steamboats would become one of the
central images in Huckleberry Finn: the Walter
Scott, on which was found the corpse of Huck's
despicable father, Pap Finn. Sir Walter Scott also
became famous in Twain's writing as a cultural
shorthand for an entire host of features associated broadly with the South. His analysis of what
he called the "Walter Scott disease" focused on
the hypnotic powers of ideology:
[it] sets the world in love with dreams
and phantoms; with decayed and swinish
forms of religion; with decayed and
degraded systems of government; with
the sillinesses and emptinesses, sham
grandeurs, sham gauds, and sham chivalries of a brainless and long-vanished
society. [Scott] did measureless harm;
more real and lasting harm, perhaps,
than any other individual that ever
wrote. (327)
Elsewhere, Twain added to the list of objects
and ideas he associates with Scott by including
duels, inflated speech, frilly architecture, "windy
humbuggeries," and in general what he calls the
"jejune romanticism" of the South. One of his most
audacious claims is his statement that "Sir Walter
has so large a hand in making southern character,
as it existed before the war, that he is in great
measure responsible for the war" (327, 285, 328).
Twain's trip down the Mississippi proved to
be a mighty catalyst in bringing back the stories
from that period. The opening chapters, about the
myth of the river and the many great explorers
(and often Jesuits) who "discovered" it, are quite
interesting and provide a delightful introduction
to the river as a central character in the plot of the
story. Twain includes a lengthy description of the
death of his younger brother Henry, killed in a
steamboat explosion, that serves as an exclamation
point at the termination of his own adolescence.
Throughout, Life on the Mississippi is full of numerous other queer stories and tall tales.
Sadly, the book has gained a reputation of
being itself rather windy. Some readers find the
second half of the book to be inferior to the first.
This may be primarily because the first half features the "Old Times" sketches, which many
(including myself) consider to be among the finest

writing Twain ever did, which is saying a lot. The
book does become episodic as it lengthens, and
there is a certain quality to the book's second half
that is suggestive of what today we might call a
cut and paste job. But some of those episodes are
full of fun and insight, and the book is denigrated
(and even ignored) too often for those elements.
Certainly by comparison with the marvelous
"Old Times" sketches, one must admit that the
second half is not as compelling, as "great literature." However, it would be a grave mistake to
think that Twain's attention somehow lapsed, or
that there is no structure or an overall plan to the
book, let alone genius. Clearly it is time for this
minor masterpiece to recover a wider audience.
The book as a whole is full of surprises, and the
nuanced argument about the genesis of the economic and cultural disadvantages to southern
society are as relevant today as they were a
century ago.

Today, most educated Americans have probably read Huck Finn and Tom Sawyer, and possibly
almost nothing else by the man often called the
Great American Writer. That is too bad. His travel
writings (such as Innocents Abroad and Roughing It)
are still astonishing and very funny, his writing on
the ambiguities of race (such as Puddn'head Wilson
and "A True Story") are still powerful, and his social
justice essays in later life (such as "The United
States of Lyncherdom" and "To the Person Sitting in
Darkness") still pack quite a wallop. Among all of
Twain's writings that are generally ignored these
days, however, none is more deserving of wider
attention than Life on the Mississippi.

t

Harold K. Bush Jr. is Associate Professor of

English at Saint Louis University and author most
recently of Mark Twain and the Spiritual Crisis of
His Age (University of Alabama Press, 2007).

being lutberan
Lutherans in the Marketplace
Robert Saler

M

ARTIN MARTY BEGAN HIS BRIEF BUT PENE-

trating biography of Martin Luther with
an epigraph from W. H. Auden's oftquoted 1940 sonnet, "Luther":

"... All words, Great Men, Societies are bad,
The Just shall live by Faith ... " he cried in dread.
And men and women were glad,
Who'd never cared or trembled in their lives.
Auden's insight captures the feeling that
haunts many contemporary Lutherans, both in the
academy and in the parishes: have our lives, particularly the lives of those of us living out our
Lutheranism in the relative comfort of North
America, become such that we are no longer in a
position to care, much less tremble, at the spiritual
mysteries and gospel insights that Luther
bequeathed to the church that bears his name?
Auden's fundamental suspicion was that
Luther was an anomaly even in his own time, that
his struggle to find a message of grace amidst the
world's sinfulness and God's hiddenness was
largely unique to him. In recent history, myriad
critics of Luther have shared this suspicion. The
nineteenth-century rationalists that largely evacuated most prominent theological traditions of their
seemingly outdated "particulars" found little to
like in a late-medieval monk who could not write
for three pages without discussing such ungenteel notions as the devil, sinfulness, and
humanity's thoroughgoing need for undeserved
grace. In the mid-twentieth century, as theologies
linked to "demythologization" and existentialist
worldviews gained prominence, Lutherans in particular began to ask aloud whether the question
that has defined their church for centuriesnamely, how humans find justification in the face
of God's judgment-should give way to more
modem formulations. Most commonly, these suggestions took the form of questions about how to
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find "authentic" existence in the face of a threatening "abyss of meaninglessness."
And today that nagging fear of obscurity
lingers on among Lutherans. Lutherans historically have had the sense that the core struggles of
a church play a large part in shaping its identity.
The questions define the answers, and both define
the church. This compels us to ask: do the key
issues of faith to which Lutheranism speaks
require updating? Does the Lutheran church in all
its varieties answer questions that few, if any, are
asking? As both the Missouri Synod and the
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America begin
major outreach and evangelization initiatives in
the face of declining numbers, these concerns are
-necessarily at the fore .
Seminarians who go out into the parish for the
first time are often (and correctly) told that they
must find ways of "translating" their knowledge
of technical theological concepts into language
that will be accessible to their congregations. As
any good language scholar will agree, however,
effective translation requires both sensitivity to the
original source and a linguistic/conceptual alternative that will not utterly betray the meaning of
the original. Lutheran theology is by nature scandalous in its particularity and severe in its selfimposed limits, which means that many of the
translation options available today (here we can
call to mind so-called "prosperity gospels" or
those church growth strategies that would have us
obsessing over "how many St. John's worshipped
last Sunday" ) cannot translate Lutheran concepts;
they can only traduce them.
It is certainly correct that the church's collective understanding of our Lutheran identity and
the core questions of our faith should be revisited
often and revisited well. However, the danger
comes when these discussions take on what
Richard John Neuhaus has called a "neo-philiac"
tone: the unexamined conviction that the circum-

stances of one's own time and place are absolutely
unique and unprecedented in human history, and
therefore require radically new strategies on the
part of those who wish to remain relevant in the
new era. Two assumptions underpin this neophiliac stance, particularly when addressing the
role of churches. First, such a view necessitates
that the human situation be regarded as mutable
and variable across time; second, it regards "relevance" to a given setting as an unqualified good.
Lutherans, I would suggest, are in a helpful
position to appreciate both the merits and the
dangers of this stance. Paradigm shifts in our own
perception do occur, and these shifts are often
brought on by encountering people and/or situations that are genuinely foreign to our previous
experience. Theology, for example, has benefited
from the recognition that the proliferation of
nuclear weapons has the potential to bring about
unprecedented levels of destruction, that the scientific possibilities associated with genetics and
modem reproduction create ethical dilemmas that
our forebears could not have foreseen, and that
one's perspective on such classical Christian
virtues as humility and patience in suffering likely
depends (more than we perhaps would like to
admit) on one's gender, race, and economic status.
The danger of neo-philia, however, stems
from the fact that its two aforementioned assumptions implicitly give rise to a third: that a church's
willingness to change even its most fundamental
assertions about the human condition is always
necessary for effective gospel proclamation to
those living out that condition in the contemporary world. It is this last implication that should
give serious pause to Lutherans.
Part of the ambiguity comes from linking theological imperatives to one of the more pernicious aspects of contemporary consumerism. The
persistent belief in constantly new possibilities
and the wholly unprecedented needs that arise
from them is, in fact, a crucial ingredient in freemarket economics. As we are besieged by products and services that promise to offer satisfaction of a perceived need, we are meant to forget
that a product that truly could produce satisfaction in a customer (literally, satis Jacere, "bringing
about enough") would be financially disastrous
for the seller. Nothing would be more detrimen-

tal to the marketplace qua marketplace than
enduring (as opposed to fleeting) consumer satisfaction: the belief that one has enough, that no
new products or services are needed, that indeed
there is a benefit to conforming one's identity to
what one already possesses rather than continually trying on new identities and new products to
go with them.
The most disturbing thing about the assumption that the church must constantly speak to the
"new conditions" of humanity is how peacefully
such an agenda conforms to this logic of the marketplace. The relationship between a gospel message that preaches the sufficiency of God's grace
for sinners and a belief that the church's message
is continually inadequate to "changing times"
must be antagonistic. Both cannot be correct. As
Lutherans think about how we are to proclaim the
gospel in the so-called "spiritual marketplace" of
the North American church scene, perhaps we
should raise the question of whether there is
something beneficial in our message being somewhat "irrelevant" to the times.
Luther's own commentaries on the Bible, particularly the Old Testament books, show us the
benefits to this "irrelevant" approach. Luther's
interpretation of the Genesis narratives, for example, rendered the characters of Noah, Abraham,
Eve, and Jacob marvelously contemporary. I can
still recall a course in graduate school in which the
beleaguered professor tried earnestly to explain, to
a snickering class, why Luther thought that Cain's
offering to God was rejected because "Cain wanted
to be pope." But Luther's rationale for taking these
liberties was very much in line with his theology:
by positing the essentially unchanging character of
the human situation before God, the gospel message of salvation- a message that begins with
Adam and Eve (Genesis 3:15), continues through
Abraham, and endures through the last daysbecomes a word for all humanity at all times.
Theologically asserting the unity of human experience is the ultimate historical inclusivism. This
assertion, as much as baptism and the Eucharist,
brings about the communion of the saints.
Such a proclamation, though, requires doing
what Luther understood both Noah, himself, and
the true church throughout the ages to be about:
preaching the reality of the human situation

before God (with all the talk of sin, judgment, and
death that such preaching entails) so that themessage of grace in Christ Jesus could be heard with
authenticity. In such cases, "relevance" by the
world's standards would be tantamount to falsehood. Only in rebellion against those standards
can there be gospel. To paraphrase George
Lindbeck, the point was not to conform this message to its time and place, but rather to conform
the time and place to the message.
Luther, and the Christians down through the
centuries who have identified with his legacy,
rightfully have derived a deep comfort from the
thought that there are abiding constants in our
human situation before God-the chief of these
being our need for undeserved grace. The comfort that this engenders is not one of complacency, of satisfaction with the status quo even
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when the status quo has proven itself inadequate
to the gospel. Rather, it is the sense of connection
between an essentially unvarying human condition and an eternally trustworthy answer to that
condition. In the midst of an ever-expanding
marketplace whose life depends on complimenting us on our new needs in order to sell us new
products, perhaps the most needed ministry of
the church is to refuse to be "relevant" on any
terms other than its own. In doing so, we will
keep faith with all the saints through time who
have sung praises to the One who "is the same
yesterday, today, and forever." t

Robert Saler is a doctoral student at Lutheran School
of Theology at Chicago.

pulpit and pew
Owed to Mom
Tom Willadsen
ON'T ASK TifE MOTifER ABOUT THE 19605. SHE
doesn't remember any of the events that
made the decade notorious. The upheavals
in her life cannot compare to those of our nation.
Americans merely faced three assassinations, the
escalation of the war in Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs,
the Cuban Missile Crisis, the civil rights movement,
and the collapse of the 1969 Cubs.
The mother weathered more.

D

In 1960 her premiere son was born.
In 1962 her mother died.
In 1963 her father remarried.
In March 1964 her ultimate son was born.
In October 1964 her husband of six years died.
In February 1965 she returned with her two
sons to her hometown.
In October 1965 her sister had a breakdown,
divorced, and moved home with her father
and step-mother.
In 1966 the Cubs hired Leo Durocher.
In 1968 her father suffered his second heart
attack.

Through all these events, her ultimate son, with
the perspective of more than three decades, marvels
at the stability of his home life, the constants.
Soft boiled eggs or oatmeal for breakfast
every Tuesday.
The celebratory, even sacramental observance
of the first BLT sandwich of summer.
The one morning in eighteen years when he
and the mother both overslept (also the only
day he ate hot lunch in high school).
Jigsaw puzzles and chips and dip every year
on New Year's Eve.
The one morning in eighteen years when
there was no juice for breakfast, and his subsequent hissy fit at this failing.
Barbecued potato chips and Kool-Aid to

watch the All-Star game.
Long-running games of Aggravation, Crazy
8's, Battleship, Clue, Boggle, gin rummy,
cribbage, even backgammon. (The brothers
do not play bridge to this day. The mother
never taught them. She wanted to retain one
game at which they would not, eventually,
defeat her.)
As a grandmother she has been dragged into
games of PokeMon and chess, with a gracious and
cooperative, though tepid, enthusiasm.
RUGALITY IS ANOTHER THEME IN HER LIFE. EVERY
time the mother saved eight cents using a
coupon for raisin bran, or received a $1.50
rebate from the Mrs. Paul's fish stick people, that
money was thrown into a jar. By the end of the
year, these savings purchased the family
Christmas tree.
Every time the mother got a fifty-cent piece in
change, it went into a different place. Eventually
enough was saved to go out for dinner. The family
never went the same place twice. When the mother
dropped the fifty-cent pieces at Pizza Works in
1975, the premier son, then fifteen, did not break
stride as he headed toward the exit.
Starting in 1973, each December was marked by
the preemptive announcement that "Christmas
would be a little lean this year." The purchase of
ultimate son's trombone, prompted by his overbite,
caused by his thumb sucking, caused the paucity
that year.
Still, on December 25, ultimate son found
Battleship under the tree, a game that resides in his
current home. Looking back at Christmases and
birthdays, the brothers cannot recall anything other
than the abundance and appropriateness of gifts.
There were always books and stockings that
included a toothbrush and were filled with what is
now called "pifiata chum."

F

Both sons enjoyed private music lessons; braces
(which were more endured than enjoyed); vacations to see friends, relatives on the father's side,
and historic sites; movies, especially when it was
"beastly hot"; tickets to symphony concerts featuring Victor Borge and Benny Goodman; and special
tenth birthdays.
In the premier son's case, his tenth birthday
was his and his brother's first trip to Wrigley Field,
that ivy-covered burial ground. Cubs 10 - Reds 2,
winning pitcher, Bill Hands, home runs by Jim
Hickman and Billy Williams.
Ultimate son enjoyed a surprise tenth birthday
party that was truly surprising.

H

ONESTY AND HUMOR MARKED AND SHAPED

their lives together. The mother could not
send a get well card to someone who is
terminally ill. That would be dishonest. She
looked for cards that say, "I hope you're feeling
better" or "I'm thinking of you." Both sons were
honest with her, too.
Last month, ultimate son found himself seemingly channeling the mother's spirit in this conversation, with the Weasel Boy:
Daddy, a window on the garage broke!
No, no, "I broke a window on the garage."
I broke a window on the garage.
Did you get hurt? No? Good, let's clean it up.
The mother taught, "First you get the grammar
and responsibility correct, then you deal with the
mess."
The mother approached all of life's challenges
with grace and rich humor. And her humor was
always a reaction to the hand she was dealt. Rarely
did she repeat jokes or introduce humor; it always
came as a response. In life one either laughs or cries,
and given the choice, it is always better to laugh.
The mother was wise enough to know that one
is not always given the choice.

A

brother. He was about seven; premier son would
have been eleven. The phone rang. The mother
answered it. The boys started to fight.
Cause ... effect.
No one remembers what they were fighting
about.
They wanted to kill each other.
The mother put down the phone, ran to the
kitchen, and got the Mira kitchen timer. "I am so
damn mad at you kids! Fight! I want you to fight
for five minutes! Fight!!"
(Another thing about the mother is she was
judicious in her use of profanity. On those rare
occasions when she dropped the D-bomb, it got
attention.)
The brothers could not fight. They were too
busy laughing, not at the mother and her rage,
which was real and mighty, but at the absurdity of
having been given permission, no, at having been
commanded, to do what they had been forbidden
all their lives.
They never fought again. Physically. Now
they express their hostility through puns and
snide remarks. And no, no one longs for the days
of fists, fury, and headlocks.
And as the seminar wound down, ultimate son
realized that the mother taught him that humor
solves problems. It's not a mere palliative, the
spoon full of sugar that helps the medicine go
down; humor can make things right and whole
again.

A

S THE MOTHER TURNS SEVENTY, THE SONS

weep tears of joy and gratitude, and tears
of laughter, for the life the mother built
for them, the foundation on which their own families are being built.
Honesty, humility, frugality, and laughter. In
1964 these were the only tools in the mother's tool
box. Later, she added guilt, and used these tools to
raise a family. f

S ADULTS BOTH SONS WERE IN A SEMINAR ON

telling family stories. Ultimate son told
the story of the last time he fought his
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life togetber
Trail Maintenance
Paul f. Willis

O

NE SIZZLING AFTERNOON THE SUMMER AFTER

kindergarten, I brought out every one of
my toys to our shaded patio and arranged
them for all the kids in the neighborhood to enjoy.
I pictured groups of friends contentedly assembling, some shaping playdough, others coloring
Mickey Mouse between the lines, others building
orderly towns out of wooden blocks, through
which yet others would lay tracks for a wooden
train that snapped together. I spread out all of
these things and more to give everyone sufficient
room. Then, like the servant in the parable, I went
out into the lanes and hedges of our block to compel the other children to this carefully prepared
feast of recreational opportunity. To my surprise, I
could persuade no one to come. Whether different
ones of them had married a wife or purchased a
yoke or two of oxen I cannot now recall. But
nobody was interested. I went back to my patio
and wistfully surveyed the ruins of my social
utopia. Then I put all of the toys away.
What interests me now about this memory is
not the failure of the experiment. (As I recall, I did
not lack for friends or brothers to play with. Nor
did I mind playing alone.) What interests me is the
impulse behind it. "These are my toys," I wanted
to say. "I want to share them with all of you. The
more of you I can share them with, the happier I
will be." Nor did I imagine anyone fighting over
these toys. My generosity would somehow produce a perfect amity among all.
Some thirty years later, my wife and I took
twenty-four college students to England for a
semester of study. This was a group that did not
always get along. Some were very angry with me
for weeks at a time, for reasons I found hard to discern. Later in the semester, I discovered that a
good many of these students had painful relationships with their fathers. Some had been physically
abused, others abandoned. Others simply suffered
an emotional distance. The anger directed at me

by these students was anger that was transferred:
in our ad hoc family for the semester, I was the
father. Realizing this, however, did not make the
situation much better. I still bore the anger of these
students and slipped into a mild depression.
Back home after the semester was over, I
sought the help of a therapist, who, as a good
Jungian, told me to pay attention to my dreams.
One of my dreams brought a sense of comfort. I
was camped in an ancient hemlock forest with a
whole variety of people: my wife and children
and brothers and parents, my students and colleagues and old school friends, my teachers and
pastors from the past, even authors dead and
gone that I had read but never met. It was morning, and sunlight filtered through the hemlocks
onto the moss and ferns and flowers. I helped
everybody on with their packs, and we headed up
a fresh, damp trail, ice axes firmly in hand. Setting
a slow but purposeful pace, I was in the lead, and
everyone else was plodding along agreeably
behind me. Through gaps in the trees overhead
we caught a glimpse of a snowy volcano, white
and gleaming and hopeful against the morning
sky. It was understood that this summit was our
goal for the day. We were going to climb it. But we
weren't going to hurry. We would go slow, and
enjoy every step, and make sure that everyone
made it to the top.
That was my dream. My therapist told me it
was a dream of healing and wholeness. A dream
that brought everyone in my life together, in a setting that I dearly loved. As I think about it now,
the dream may be a wilderness version of sharing
my toys on the back patio. In both there is a generous impulse. Here are my toys; here are the mountains that I love. And in both there is community.
Everyone is playing together peaceably; everyone
is hiking in a humble kind of gratitude. There is no
jockeying for position. I am in the front, but only
to take care of the others. I felt none of the burdens

of leadership in my wilderness dream. Only the
joys of helping and of being helped.
I wonder: have I ever experienced this sort of
thing in my waking life? I have been a college
teacher for almost thirty years now. Has the classroom ever become this charmed space of community? There have been moments, of course.
Moments I am sure that I have read a poem aloud
in a way it deserves, or moments in which I have
said something (unplanned) that seems to be the
right word of understanding. Or, more importantly, moments in which I've really listened to
something a student has had to say. For the most
part, however, I have not experienced the sense of
a shared gift in the classroom. I seem to grade a little too rigorously for the students' liking, and I am
perhaps too much of an introvert to mount a
charismatic presence. Every year, at graduation,
my heart palpitates a little when the provost
begins to announce the teacher-of-the-year
awards. But every year the awards are given to
persons with different gifts than my own.
What about my years as a mountain guide, the
real-life place that the dream came from? Again,
there are moments of full connection, and plenty
of them. Finding Lewis's monkey flower at the
foot of a thundering waterfall, crossing a river
safely in the North Cascades, summiting a Sierra
peak that no one thought they could climb, dropping packs in the evening by a quiet tam. The
memories come crowding in. But I also recall the
whining, the complaining, the sheer human recalcitrance of people who are asked to be a little cold,
a little tired, a little hungry, a little blistered, a little dirty, a little bug-bitten. I also recall the sheer
boredom on the trail of listening to adolescents
discuss the latest movies, the latest sitcoms, the latest, greatest video games. There are no perfect
group experiences. Only in dreams. Only in the
kingdom of God, which is sort of now, but very
much not yet.
And yet. What I want to write about is a trail I
made last year along a creek on the edge of our
California campus. The trail follows a ravine that
is thick with brush and otherwise not very accessible. It is wild and shady down there and almost
completely out of sight of any of the college buildings or neighboring homes. With all of its
branches, the trail amounts to about a mile of soli50 151 The Cresset Lent I 2007

tary walking. It cost me seven months of slashing
and digging to put the trail into place, and still
takes me several hours a week to maintain. When
I built it, however, I was only thinking of myself. I
was feeling hemmed in by the routine geography
of the college campus and the adjacent faculty
housing where I live. I wanted a place to wander
alone, a place I could take my dog off the leash.
Also, my mother had just died of cancer, and I felt
a need to clear a new way for myself, to release the
energy of my grief. So I threw myself at the poison
oak and sure enough cleared a way.
I didn't advertise this trail. I didn't go door to
door and ask the neighbors to share it with me. I
even took a little pride in obscuring the places it
started and stopped on public roadways. But to
my surprise, people began to find it. Perhaps they
found the trail because they needed what I
needed: a new way of being in the same place.
Overworked faculty members and their maladjusted children. Stray stvdents. Lonely visitors
to the campus. And neighbors from beyond the
campus. Lots of neighbors. Neighbors with dogs.
Neighbors who had never had a kind word to say
about the local college.
I didn't meet them all at once. They weren't in
some long line, all hiking at my heels. But one at a
time they'd find me working on the path and stop
to thank me. Effusively. Some with strange tears in
their eyes. A woman who, as a child, had suffered
terrible abuse. Afraid of the woods, she'd decided
this trail was friendly, and came to walk it every
day. One morning, she told me, embarrassed that
she had created a private name for every section of
the trail, every tum. Another woman, recovering
from a painful divorce talked to me about
Buddhist circumambulation and mandalas and
other things I didn't know much about, but when
she sensed my confusion she simplified and let me
know the trail for her was a place to pray. And a
man who told me, "This is the best thing that has
happened to this neighborhood in thirty years." I
found him spraying poison oak along the trail
with a homemade brew. In fact, he extended one
branch of the path to his back door so that he
could have direct access.
So here is the irony of it all. My best gift to a
local community wasn't really intended as a gift at
all. I created a path for myself and discovered

there is no such thing as a private trail. Though
one person may carve it out, a footpath only continues to exist as communal expression. It is maintained not so much by one man's shovel and
shears as by the feet of all who use it. It is like writing a book. One does so to satisfy one's own
vision. But then, when the book is published, people read it or they don't. And if they don't, the
book does not continue to exist, in any meaningful
sense of that word.
Sometimes this communal reading and maintenance takes even more tangible forms. One part
of the trail provides a leafy shortcut between the
college track and the home of our college track
coach, one of the most community-minded people
I have ever met. His fourteen-year-old daughter is
dying of a brain tumor, and the pain of this is
etched on his face. He took her to the track by way
of the trail once, when she could still walk a little,
and very proudly let me know. But now she is
waiting at home to die. One would think a tragedy

of this depth would preclude all outward vision.
But one morning last month, our good coach had
his whole team out on the trail with rakes and
hoes and line trimmers, doing their bit to erase the
encroaching growth of spring.
I think too of the neighbor from beyond the
campus who now patrols the poison oak with his
hand-pumped brew. When I first met him on the
trail, he eagerly asked for my email address. For
several weeks afterward he peppered me with
questions about tools to use, thistles to cut, stream
crossings to rearrange. Then the emails stopped. I
learned from a mutual friend that his twenty-twoyear-old son had just died of a heart attack. I sent
him a fumbling message of sorrow, and I have not
seen him since. But when I do, we will be sharing
the same path. 'f

Paul J. Willis is Professor of English at Westmont
College in Santa Barbara, California.

nation
Politics as Gardening
Peter Meilaender
"Eternal gardening is the price of liberty."
-Charles Dudley Warner
My Summer in a Garden
I

N

ATURE IS A BIG DEAL THESE DAYS. AMONG

my (mostly conservative, evangelical)
students, environmentalism is the
trendy issue. The cost of gas has everyone worried about energy prices. Even President Bush
has become an enthusiastic cheerleader for alternative fuels. The market for organic food continues to expand so rapidly that even Wal-Mart, that
most un-Bobo of chains, has gotten in on the
action. Trade wars simmer over genetically modified foods. Newsweek last summer published a
cover story on "The New Greening of America."
You can't listen to NPR for more than fifteen minutes without hearing someone comment grimly
about global warming.
Even more problematic than our relation to
the natural world, however, is human nature itself.
Is same-sex marriage "unnatural," for example? Or
is the insistence that marriage is a relationship
between a man and a woman a purely conventional prejudice? Do sex-specific social roles in
general have any basis in human nature? Nor is
sex by any means the only social battleground for
debating human nature. Advances in biotechnology, the possibility of cloning human beings,
stem-cell research, all raise difficult questions
about the content of human nature, its limits, and
its connection to the physical body.
Even economic issues, which might at first
appear less likely to raise such controversial
questions, ultimately involve important assumptions about human nature: how self-interested
we are, how lazy, how driven to better our condition. Economic policy attempts to manipulate
social behavior through the use of incentives, but
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that very attempt presupposes an understanding
of human nature sufficient to predict our
responses to policy-makers' carrots and sticks.
Yet successful attempts at influencing behavior,
by shaping our assumptions and habits, can in
tum affect our likely responses-can, that is, alter
what we had taken to be our nature. The nature
of our nature is puzzling precisely because its
content is impossible to demonstrate in any decisive way. For every plausible account of how
some social convention arises from human
nature, there is an equally plausible account of
how social practices could have produced what
we mistakenly take to be natural.
Nor do these disputes over the relation
between human nature and public policy follow
predictable partisan lines. On "social issues,"
especially those relating to marriage and the family, conservatives are likely to appeal to a fixed
and unchanging conception of human nature, liberals to a more flexible one. On issues of crime
and poverty, too, conservatives like to poke fun at
liberals for having an overly malleable understanding of human nature, one that attributes
such problems to unjust social circumstances
rather than to unavoidable human perversity. In
international contexts, however- President
Bush's campaign to spread democracy notwithstanding-liberals are more likely to speak in
terms of universal human rights, while conservatives defend cultural particularity, patriotism,
and national sovereignty. Unless, of course, the
issue is free trade and open markets, which conservatives promote despite their corrosive effect
upon traditional cultures, but liberals view with
suspicion, despite their ability to improve the lot
of the global poor.
Though our understanding of human nature
is thus closely connected to our views on many
important issues, we lack a clear language for
describing its dual role as both source and

product of human culture. As a result, we tend to
oversimplify.
II
The debate over human nature and its political consequences runs like a faultline through the
history of political thought. Aristotle declared that
"man is by nature a political animal," meaning that
human nature develops fully only within the context of political (not merely social) community.
The evidence for this, he suggested, is our capacity
for reason and speech, which permit us to reflect
upon and argue about the justice and injustice of
our communal arrangements. Early modern
thinkers, by contrast, typically claimed that political community is artificial, not natural (hence the
need to create it through some social contract).
Hobbes is especially emphatic on this point, conceding that some animals, like ants and bees, associate naturally, but that "the agreement. .. of men,
is by Covenant only, which is Artificial." Indeed,
he turns Aristotle's evidence on its head: reason
and speech, far from pointing towards political
association, are causes of human conflict, because
they permit "some men [to] represent to others,
that which is Good, in the likenesse of Evill; and
Evill, in the likenesse of Good."
Disagreement over the naturalness of politics
tends to generate different descriptions of politics
itself. By and large, those who think of politics as
the appropriate fulfillment of human nature tend
toward an educative conception of politics, while
those who regard it as a conventional corrective to
human weakness favor a coercive one. In Aristotle's
Politics, for example, there is hardly any discussion
at all of the coercive role of legal force, whereas
education is the central focus of his description of
the ideal state. Hobbes, by contrast, concludes that
because human agreement is only artificial, "it is no
wonder if there be somewhat else required (besides
Covenant) to make their Agreement constant and
lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in
awe." We might also think of James Madison's
famous question from Federalist 51: "But what is
government itself, but the greatest of all reflections
on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary."
There is a Christian version of the same argument, most easily (if somewhat roughly) described

as a characteristic difference of emphasis between
Augustinian and Thomistic traditions. Thomas,
following Aristotle, treats politics as natural. In
answer to the question of "whether in the state of
innocence man would have been master over
man," Thomas replies (with reference to the
Politics) that, while slavery would not have existed
prior to the fall, some persons would indeed have
been masters over others in the sense that "he who
has the office of governing and directing free men,
can be called a master." Similarly, Thomas defines
law simply as "an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated"-without any reference at all to coercion. Augustine, by contrast,
argues that God originally did not want man "to
have dominion over any but irrational creatures,
not man over man, but man over the beasts." He
therefore set up "the first just men ... as shepherds
of flocks, rather than as kings of men, so that in
this way also God might convey the message of
what was required by the order of nature, and
what was demanded by the deserts of sinners."
Earlier in the City of God he asks, "Remove justice,
and what are kingdoms but gangs of criminals on
a large scale?" Later, however, he argues that no
earthly polity possesses justice-suggesting a
rather uncomfortable answer to his earlier question. Coercion, judgement, and punishment are
ineliminable elements of political life.
Again, the point is not to pick sides in an
admittedly oversimplified argument. Law and
government in fact have both an educative and
shaping role as well as a coercive function. But it is
difficult to talk about this clearly without a better
way of describing the nature of our nature.
III
I suffer from a pair of weaknesses endemic to
the academic life: I cannot take up any new activity without reading a bunch of books about it, and
sooner or later I manage to connect every such
activity with reflections about my own field. A
couple of years ago I bought my first house, so I've
now spent a few summers fussing around in the
yard, trying-with what a charitable observer
might describe as very limited success-to
improve its appearance. So I've taken to reading a
few gardening books each summer. One of the

first was Michael Pollan's Second Nature. Pollan's
theme is that gardening represents a middle path
between two competing but unsatisfactory stances
towards the natural world: on the one hand, a
wilderness ethic that seeks to eliminate all human
intervention and leave the world in its "natural"
condition; on the other, domination and development driven entirely by human wishes. The former is inhospitable to human habitation, since
nature, left to itself, is "indifferent to our survival."
But the latter can provoke a backlash from nature,
as our increasing understanding of environmental
issues makes clear.
The garden, Pollan suggests, provides "a middle ground between these two positions." A garden is neither simply natural nor simply artificial,
but rather both at the same time. It transforms
nature without violating it, raising it up, rather, to
a higher level, one that is welcoming and suited to
human life. It is, we might say, natural, but it is no
longer merely natural. "A garden is, or should be,"
writes Pollan, "a midspace between [raw nature]
and the parking lot, a place that admits of both
nature and human habitation. But it is not.. . a harmonious compromise between the two, nor is it
stable ... It requires human intervention, or else it
will collapse." The gardener sustains the compromise by being attentive to nature and its demands,
while also embracing the need for culture. "The
gardener in nature is that most artificial of creatures, a civilized human being .... [T]hough h: lives
in nature, he is no longer strictly of nature." In the
garden, the line dividing nature from convention
cannot be identified; or, better, nature and convention cease to be dichotomous at all.
In this sense, gardening proves to be an excellent metaphor for politics. As an image, it nicely
captures the complex relationship between
human nature and human culture, one that helps
us appreciate the insights of both the Aristotelian
and the Hobbesian (or liberal), the Thomistic and
the Augustinian traditions. Like a garden, human
nature is never "mere" nature. We encounter it
always and only as shaped by particular social
and political environments, so that it becomes
impossible to say with any certainty just what in
us is really "natural" and what is "conventional."
Indeed, the very attempt to draw that distinction
is in a sense "unnatural." Human nature, like that
54155 The Cresset Lent I 2007

of a garden, is always (to borrow Pollan's title)
"second nature." In a striking phrase from Burke,
it is the "prerogative" of "that wonderful structure, Man ... to be in a great degree a creature of
his own making."
From a political standpoint, this means that
every law or policy has an "educative" effect,
exerting an influence upon the second nature that
is our only nature. There is thus no question of
remaining "neutral" among different cultural and
political options, for every decision to act or to
refrain from acting has its effect on us. Nor can
there be a question of refusing to intervene and
letting "nature" take its course; nor of discovering
the one policy truly in accord with "nature." The
question, rather, can only be whether the second
nature that we together create promotes or undermines the conditions for a decent human life.
By thus abandoning the language of liberal
neutrality, the gardening metaphor may appear to
tip the scales in favor of the Aristotelian{Thomistic
tradition and its educative image of politics.
Indeed, the potential danger of the metaphor is
that by calling to mind images of, say, an elaborately planned and formal French garden, it may
encourage illusions of excessive human power
and control, inviting an overly powerful, bureaucratic, regulatory, or just downright meddlesome
state. Fortunately, such illusions of control are easily dispelled by, well, doing a little gardening. For
if there is one thing the gardener is acutely aware
of, it is that he is hardly in control. From storms
and droughts to early frosts, from fungi and bacteria to the slugs that ate every one of the bean
plants in my vegetable bed, the gardener is at the
mercy of many forces. The garden's existence is
fragile and threatened, no more self-sustaining
than is our own second nature- as anyone knows
who has left a garden unattended for a few weeks
while away on a summer vacation. "The man who
undertakes a garden," writes Charles Dudley
Warner, "is relentlessly pursued."
He felicitates himself, that, when he gets it
once planted, he will have a season of rest
and of enjoyment in the sprouting and
growing of his seeds. It is a green anticipation. He has planted a seed that will keep
him awake nights; drive rest from his

bones, and sleep from his pillow. Hardly
is the garden planted, when he must begin
to hoe it. The weeds have sprung up all
over it in a night. They shine and wave in
redundant life.... You can't get up too
early, if you have a garden.
Indeed, as Warner's hoe indicates, outright
force is no less an element in gardening than is
coercion in politics (as the early modem liberals
correctly understood). "Weeding," says Pollan, "is
not a nuisance that follows from gardening, but its
very essence." In that sense, the preservation of life
in a garden is intimately connected with the taking
of it. The gardener knows that he inhabits a fallen
world, not a paradise abundant with beauty and
nourishment but a field of thorns and weeds
where any flowers that grow will be watered by
the sweat of his brow. Thus, if liberal neutrality is
not possible, neither is any simple politics of the
common good, not when the very content of that
good is the subject of fierce political controversy.
That is one dilemma of politics in a fallen world:

we are necessarily co-shapers of our nature, but
cannot hope to agree about the goal of that shaping. Peaceful resolution of disputes over the cultivation of our second nature occurs only in the
shadow of the hoe.
At once natural and artificial, the garden provides a metaphor for the political cultivation of our
own nature, capturing its complexity more
adequately than do more familiar but oversimplified appeals to human nature. The activity of gardening points to the permanent need for human
culture, while reminding us of its very real limits.
Gardening thus teaches humility, not overconfidence. But also not despair, for the gardener is the
very embodiment of hopefulness. H . Richardson
Wright refers to replanting an old orchard "with
the fond expectation that we shall live long enough
to enjoy the fruits of this new generation." Only,
however, with the aid of eternal gardening. f

Peter Meilaender is Associate Professor of Political
Science at Houghton College.

INDICATOR SPECIES
More than 1,000 bird species face extinction
because of an alarming and accelerating loss
of biodiversity, a study warns today.
-The Guardian, 8 March 2004
More than a thousand, us
among them. No song to mourn
their absence in a universe of merely
inorganic flight. No machine can sing the sun
to light each morning.
A dark chorus of car alarms is the entire music of our loss.

Steven Schroeder

law
One Man's Fight
J. D. Buhl
Barry W. Lynn. Piety and Politics: The Right-Wing
Assault on Religious Freedom. New York:
Harmony, 2006.
HE SUBTITLE OF BARRY LYNN 'S NEW BOOK

T

should be, "My Fight against the RightWing Assault on Religious Freedom," for
this is a book about Reverend Lynn himself, before
anything else. Executive director of Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, and a
United Church of Christ minister, Lynn has been a
public voice against "theocracy" on all of the
issues his seven chapters address: freedom of religion, religion and public education, religious icons
and public property, faith-based initiatives, religion and politics, sexuality, and censorship. And it
is this voice that narrates the action here.
His introduction begins: "The Reverend Jerry
Falwell doesn't like me." Some of the more spectacular clashes between these titans (as well as
run-ins with James C. Dobson, Dan Patrick, and
others) are then described. The first chapter begins
the same way: "TV preacher Pat Robertson regularly calls me names ... The Reverend Jerry Falwell
routinely tells reporters that I'm not a real minister." By page 177 he is still saying, "My advocacy
of these views [in this case women's reproductive
freedom and gay and lesbian rights] and my
refusal to join the Religious Right's puritanical
moral crusades infuriates people like Jerry Falwell
and Pat Robertson, who loudly proclaim that I
must not really be a religious person." Near the
end of the book, Lynn recounts how Falwell once
called him a liar on CNBC.
These and nearly identical statements
throughout Piety and Politics make for tiresome
reading. Anyone with Christian or libertarian
interests can appreciate Lynn's indefatigable fight
against Falwell and his followers' "use [of] the
machinery of the government to impose [their]
unpleasant deity on everyone else," but annoyance
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with Lynn's constant retelling of his own adventures in the name of church-state autonomy could
dissuade a reader from finding some of his book's
cogent-and useful-insights.
It may be true that fundamentalists view secularism as their avowed enemy; Lynn sees the secular state "as the great champion of religious liberty." "It is highly ironic," he writes, "that we
wouldn't even have fundamentalist religions in
America were it not for the fact that our secular
state, by taking no positions on the truth or falsity
of religions, allows the development of all kinds
of new groups and religious structures" (123).
Another irony is found in the Religious Right's
"wholly unpersuasive" assertion that state recognition of same-sex unions would infringe on the
rights of churches. "Every house of worship in
America has the right to determine its own
parameters for would-be married couples" (203).
This means that the Roman Catholic Church can
refuse to marry non-Catholic couples, couples
who live together can be required to separate if
they desire a church wedding, churches can
refuse to marry an interfaith couple, can require
premarital counseling, and can extract promises
that children will be raised in the faith as a condition for marriage. "These conditions are
absolutely protected under the First Amendment"
(203). One of Lynn's strengths is catching his
opposition in their contradictions.
Echoing a popular bumper sticker, Lynn
writes, "God is not a Republican; God is not a
Democrat. God does not care if a Senate or House
bill passes or fails" (160). This is sound theology
and a common-sense cornerstone in Lynn's
approach to Christian faith. God does not "ordain"
anyone to run for political office. "Anyone who
claims to be running in God's name or with God's
sanction is likely to be dangerous" (160)-a good
thing for Christians to keep in mind. But the problem for Lynn is that his theological opponents

sometimes appear to be running Jesus himself for
the nation's highest office.
The Religious Right's Jesus is a distinctly
American creation. He's a creature of the
free market, a right-wing Republican who
lives in the outer suburbs. My guess is that
the Religious Right's Jesus is a member of
the National Rifle Association. The
Falwellian Jesus doesn't minister to the
poor; he hangs out with CEOs. (240)
This is the point. The Religious Right's goals
"are primarily ultraconservative, not Christian"
(240). He sadly concludes that, were Jesus to take
the pulpit in Falwell's own church, most of the
congregation "would get up and walk outside to
follow Falwell" instead.
They have done so for years. They have
listened and followed Falwell to a meanspirited and narrow-minded place. He has
led them to a dark, deep recess of
American Christianity that often seems to
dominate our national discourse these
days. (240)
True enough. In a recent Washington Post opinion piece ("Let's stop stereotyping evangelicals,"
Nov. 8, 2006), Joseph Loconte and Michael
Cromartie admit that "a handful of Christian figures reinforce the worst stereotypes of the movement." "Their loopy and triumphalist claims are
seized upon" by those looking to make a sweeping
condemnation. Lynn never uses the word "evangelical," opting to label his foes "fundamentalists."
The distinction is welcome, and important. It is
also not altogether clear: a reader can be unsure as
to just how broad the designation "fundamentalist" is meant to be. It can then be said that Lynn
spends too much of his time taking on the loopy
and triumphalist instead of working with the
thoughtful and gospel-driven. Certainly Lynn has
run across the likes of Jim Wallis, Ron Sider, or
Tony Cam polo in his public appearances, but their
presence is not felt here.
While Loconte and Cromartie insist that it is
"no thirst for theocracy but rather a love for their
neighbor that sends American evangelicals into
harm's way," Lynn sees service to the neighbor by
certain Christian outreach organizations-espe-

dally those notorious "faith-based initiatives"- as
a move towards government-sponsored religion.
Throughout his book he is clear: fundamentalists
wish to "force all of us to live under their narrow
view of Christianity" (17). These are people for
whom the separation of church and state "is a
myth, a dangerous, anti-Christian principle
imposed on the nation by judicial fiat in 1947" (2).
For example, Lynn charges that fundamentalists refuse to recognize the social causes of
poverty and other ills (124). For Loconte and
Cromartie, evangelicals-who are "redefining
social justice"-are "mindful of the material conditions that breed poverty and despair, but they
emphasize spiritual rebirth." This is exactly the
problem for Lynn. "Fundamentalists do not
believe that providing for someone's physical
needs is enough. There must always be a religious
conversion as well" (124). It is fundamentalists'
belief in "the fallen state of humankind ... the
essential wickedness of people and in the existence of literal demonic forces" that leads to the
further conviction that if a person who is poor,
addicted to drugs, or homeless would just "get
right with God (by adopting fundamentalist religious beliefs) their problems will be solved" (124).
This is solid evangelical-not just fundamentalist-theology, and Lynn treads close to insulting
those far outside his narrowed "fundamentalist"
target. But he sees conversion as the end goal of
such activity and his point is well-taken: "[A]ny
faith-based initiative that leans heavily on fundamentalist Christian providers will end up, by
default, including government funding and support of specific religious views" (124).
One of the reasons Lynn is called names by
his adversaries is his very secular insistence that
"a person can be good, moral, and fundamentally
decent without a belief in any form of god" (243).
This may be going too far for many who consider
themselves Christian, but for Lynn it is a way of
approaching one elemental flaw in the drive for
theocracy that may-he hopes-prevent thinking
people from allowing it to happen. "Were I to
assert," he writes, "that only Christians could be
good and moral, I would also have to believe that
the adherents of entire religious systems such as
Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and others
are not good and moral-an absurd stance" (243).

Thus distinguishing himself further from
"fundamentalists" -and showing little sympathy
for the position of evangelicals in generalabsurd stances are attacked throughout his book,
none more important than the idea that "the
United States has some sort of special relationship with God" (245). This is indeed "a dangerous stance to adopt" (245). America is not the
Israel of the Old Testament; it is not even the
Palestine of Jesus' day. And the ways in which it
resembles the latter more than the former are
exactly the sort of unfortunate circumstances
Lynn's fundamentalists do not want to face.
It could be that Loconte and Cromartie are
right when they write that "it is dishonest to disparage the massive civic and democratic contribution of evangelicals by invoking the excesses of
a tiny few." But Lynn indeed perceives a thirst for
theocracy and believes he has a case. It comes
down to biblical interpretation and common
sense, the difference between belief-and one's
right to it-and political power: opposing abortion does not have to mean withholding it from
women in need; condemning sex outside of marriage and opposing certain forms of birth control
does not have to mean the end of comprehensive
sex education; belief that the creation story in
Genesis is historically and scientifically true need
not mean that evolution should not be taught in
the public schools; believing that Leviticus condemns homosexuality is not necessarily the same
as believing it should be criminalized; finding
certain books, plays, films and recordings "blasphemous" does not have to lead to their being
banned (250).
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Ours is a secular state, Barry Lynn reminds
us, and as such it should have no interest-or
influence-in matters of religion. "Attempts to
put a modern interpretation on ancient religious
codes" form the basis of [fundamentalists'] ideal
government" (251). This is not the government
our founders fought for; this is not the government some members of the Supreme Court still
believe we can have. And Piety and Politics is not
the book to prevent such a government from
coming into being. Lynn's understanding of the
problem and his exposure of the Religious
Right's agenda are correct and confirmable elsewhere. Theocracy is in the minds of many who
claim to represent the gospel of Jesus Christ. He
is right to point out how their views and aspirations differ from Jesus' teachings, as they appear
in the Gospels themselves. His book will prove
entertaining for those who feel all they need do is
be outraged. But tales of televangelists' buffoonery can do little to satisfy the more sophisticated
intellectual and theological demands of this very
real threat.
Lynn acknowledges in Piety and Politics that
"the job of a spiritual leader is to bring people
together, not drive them apart" (160). His book
does not provide enough evidence-anecdotal or
otherwise-of Lynn following his own advice. In
the end, it is a warning flare, and one to be heeded.
It is neither creative nor reconciling enough to do
much about the scene it illumines. f

J.D. Buhl teaches reading and writing at Queen of All

Saints School in Concord, California.

books
Dan McAdams. The Redemptive
Self New York: Oxford,
2005.
an McAdams is perhaps
the world's leading personality psychologist, so any
new book by him is eagerly
awaited. His latest offering is
The Redemptive Self (Oxford,
2006) and, in most ways, it lives
up to the tradition of fine and
innovative scholarship that he
has brought to our understanding of the human person.
McAdams has been at the
forefront of efforts to apply narrative theory to the study of
personality psychology. During
the 1980s, a number of psychologists began an attempt to
apply narrative concepts to the
description of human development and thinking processes.
These efforts were only marginally successful until the publication of McAdams's fine book
The Stories We Live By (Guilford,
1993), which provided an excellent theoretical framework and
methodology for narrative
research in psychology. His theory and research methodology
have become a gold standard
for the field.
Narrative theory in psychology and also in the hands of
hermeneutic philosophers like
Paul Ricoeur attempts to show
how people construct their
identities through storytelling.

D

Theorists like McAdams argue
that life stories are constructed
from personal and cultural
materials gathered during
childhood, and that they are
assembled for the first time
during adolescence when we
begin to form our identity as a
person. These are stories about
us that are designed to be told,
both to ourselves and to others.
Our ideas about the story and
its audience say a lot about the
kind of people we are and our
vision for life.
In this new book, McAdams
takes his formidable narrative
skills and applies them to the
topic of generativity. First popularized by the developmental
psychologist Erik Erikson in his
great book Childhood and Society
(Norton, 1963), generativity is
the human need to support,
care for, and pass something of
substance on to a younger generation. Erikson thought that
generativity was the primary
task of middle adulthood and
that it had much to offer both
the person and the culture that
supports them. With a few
notable exceptions, such as
some work by Don Browning,
generativity has been a neglected concept, and McAdams's
narrative perspective seems a
good one to bring to the topic.
After an excellent review of
narrative theory and the concept of generativity, McAdams

gets down to business and asks:
What are the characteristics of
narratives that are constructed
by highly generative people?
McAdams believes that this
answer may vary between cultures, but that American generative narratives tend to be stories of redemption, "a deliverance from suffering to a better
world" (7).
According to McAdams's
research, the redemptive narrative of generative people is one
of essential optimism. It typically begins as the person
observes that they are born
with special blessings in the
midst of a world with much
suffering. The person feels that
they have a special calling to
help. In their story, they surmount many obstacles, draw
benefits from their struggles
along the way, and eventually
make a difference that leaves
behind a legacy. A set of values
and beliefs acquired during
childhood provides an essential
part of the system that helps
guide and motivate them in
their work. One variant of the
redemption narratives is the
healing and recovery narrative.
This narrative tells a story of a
good inner self that is in combat
against a sometimes untrustworthy world, but that with the
right plan can achieve almost
anything, including the ultimate goal of redemption: per-

sonal self-actualization. Here
redemption begins to sound
like the triumph of the therapeutic.
One chapter in the book
deals with the religious roots of
generativity,
and
here
McAdams comes up with
results that will be surprising to
some. Psychologists have a
long established habit of bashing organized religion as the
keeper of dogma and authority,
arguing that the individual
who breaks free on a lone spiritual journey is the model of
health. McAdams found, however, that highly generative
people typically have strong
ties to organized religion and
tend to do less questioning of
their values and beliefs. In the
language of the sociologist of
religion Wade Clark Roof, they
are religious dwellers as well as
seekers. McAdams also points
out a large mass of scientific
evidence demonstrating that
both generativity and religious
involvement are positively
related to a wide variety of
desirable psychological states
and better physical health. He
leaves mostly unanswered the
question of whether religious
redemption narratives might
differ in some fundamental
way from other types of narratives. The strength of great psychological theories is their ability to see common patterns, but
their weakness is the tendency
to overlook small but fundamental differences amidst the
commonalities.
McAdams asks how the
black experience in America
might lead to different kinds of
redemption narratives. He
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finds higher levels of generativity among blacks, as well as
other advantages like stronger
social networks. The black individuals he studied had redemption narratives that were similar
to those of whites, although he
also found some differences.
Blacks spoke more often of
early dangers and opponents to
their progress, and the need to
overcome setbacks to progress.
There was also a lingering pain
from early harsh experiences in
many stories.
How should we view these
American stories of redemption? Here McAdams's book
turns from psychological
analysis to social commentary.
He provides a strong critique
of the optimism in American
redemption narrative. Or in his
own words: "I come now not to
bury the redemptive self, but I
do not wish to idolize it either"
(243). He points out that
American redemption narratives have an internal contradiction: redemptive heroes are
individualists who want to
exercise agency over others,
yet at the same time they want
community and to be part of a
collective effort. The narratives
are also potentially stories of
arrogance or naivete, where
the redemptive actor assumes
that any problem is solvable by
them, and that problems not
solved can be trivialized .
Worst of all, redemption narratives can be used as a justification for violence in the service
some
greater
good .
of
American culture strongly
supports the redemption
narrative, making it difficult
for both the narrator and the

audience to tell when a heroic
redemptive story is completely
fiction.
After the deconstruction of
optimistic redemptive narratives, one turns to the last chapter in the book looking for an
alternative redemption story.
Here the reader will be disappointed. We are treated to some
good reflections on the lack of
meaning inherent in some radically postmodern views of the
world, but otherwise we are left
empty handed. McAdams has
no answer to these problems
because psychology, postmodern or otherwise, cannot on its
own provide a sense of meaning and purpose to life. We
must look beyond science to
find this.
What might be a Christian
response to the prospects and
problems of the American
redemption narrative? Certainly
many in the church would share
McAdams's skepticism about an
individualistic healing and
recovery narrative that ignores
both our personal brokenness
and the possibilities for trust in
those around us. It is also easy to
join him in criticizing the temptation toward arrogance or even
violence that can be found in
beliefs about the inevitability of
redemption and our power to
achieve it. History is littered
with secular and religious examples of these failures.
Christian redemption narratives are ultimately about hope.
Psychologists like C. R. Snyder
argue that hope is about our
ability to set goals and achieve
them. However, the Christian
vision of hope is not about getting what we want. It is an atti-

tude that life and the world are
in good hands. For Luther, hope
is more oriented to the expectation that God will be with us in
the midst of difficulties, and
that there awaits us a new life
with God that will be more than
we can imagine. This vision is
not a call to passivity-certainly
we cannot accuse Luther of
that!-but it is a call to trust. It
asks us to keep things in a
broader perspective, and to
trust that the outcome of things
is safely in the hands of a God
who can be trusted. Patience
becomes a virtue along with
energy. As Erik Erikson noted,
this basic trust in the world
helps us overcome a host of
developmental challenges and
avoid a life that lacks confidence and connectedness to
others. It is the basis of an
authentic redemption narrative.
James M. Nelson
Valparaiso University

Crystal L. Downing. How
Postmodernism Serves (My)
Faith. Downers Grove:
InterVarsity, 2006.
Heath White. Postmodernism
101. Grand Rapids: Brazos
2006.
"My pastor," an evangelical
friend instructs me, "cannot preach a single sermon without mentioning the word 'postmodem."' The good Reverend's
philosophical fixation is likely a
symptom of his church's proximity to a major university, but
he is by no means the only con-

temporary Christian leader
who feels the hot, espressotinged breath of Foucault and
Derrida on the back of his neck.
Indeed, "postmodemism" has
become a buzz-word among
many Christians who do not
otherwise trouble themselves
with philosophical matters. It is
therefore understandable that
much of the discourse on postmodernism that takes place in
Christian circles is conducted
with relatively shallow knowledge of just what "postmodernism" really is, or where it
came from. Welcome, then, are
two new books that attempt to
explicate this phenomenon,
specifically in the context of
Christian belief. Both books,
Postmodernism 101: A First
Course For the Curious Christian,
by Heath White, and How
Postmodernism Serves (My) Faith:
Questioning Truth in Language,
Philosophy, and Art, by Crystal
L. Downing, are written by and
for evangelical Christians. Both
are addressed to readers without advanced academic training in philosophy, and both aim
to dispel some of the confusion
and apprehension that surround evangelical understandings of postmodemism.
Of
the
two
books,
Postmodernism 101 is the more
compact (at 165 pages) and
more straightforward. The
stated purpose of the book is to
elucidate the main ideas of
postmodemism and offer some
suggestions for how Christians
ought to deal with this new
way of thinking. White, an
assistant professor of philosophy at the University of North
Carolina Wilmington, executes

this task with grace and
aplomb. His philosophical
training and able pen allow him
to communicate difficult ideas
clearly and efficiently. The
tidy
chapters
of
short,
Postmodernism 101 are conceived thematically, with titles
like "Truth, Power, and
Morality" and "Culture and
Irony." White quotes sparingly
from primary sources, offering
instead his own precis of complex and sometimes convoluted
ideas. Throughout the book,
White employs a friendly tone
and treads cautiously, acknowledging that such a brief treatment forces him to paint with
"a very broad brush." This
caveat, and the modesty that
accompanies it, is both salutary
and necessary, because in many
of his brief chapters White
attempts to outline the premodern, modem, and postmodem
perspectives on the issue at
hand. Any reader who comes to
Postmodernism 101 with significant knowledge of any of the
periods or issues under discussion will no doubt be frustrated
at times by White's boileddown version of complex historical and theoretical actualities. But in the end what White
loses in depth he gains back in
breadth and accessibility. And
what else is a 101 course for?
So much for the first part of
White's task. What of the second? How ought evangelical
Christians respond to the challenges of postmodernism?
White's various answers to this
question are pragmatic and
thoughtful,
leaning
more
towards the pastoral than the
theoretical. For example, take

the marquis issue: moral relativism. Christians cannot, he
writes, compromise on the issue
of moral absolutes. But how to
deal with relativist claims? One
common response to statements
denying the existence of
absolute truth- moral or otherwise-is to point out that any
such statement is itself a truthclaim, and thus the relativist
seems to undermine his own
position. White calls this tack
the "nifty logic trick." It may, he
admits, have something to it as
a logical argument, but it almost
always will lack persuasive
power. If one thinks, as many
postmoderns do, that all statements of moral truth contain a
threat of social control or violent domination, then a mere bit
of self-contradiction seems a
small price to pay for keeping
blood off one's hands. Instead,
White advises his reader to treat
the moral relativist with compassion, and to gently point out
historical examples-the Hindu
practice of suttee or South
African apartheid- which seem
to be obviously and absolutely
wrong.
Readers with strong philosophical interests might appreciate a more substantive philosophical response to the problem of relativism, and it does
not seem incredible to imagine
that the non-philosopher who
is engaged enough to read a
book on postmodernism might
be edified by such a discussion.
But then again, one cannot do it
all in 165 pages. White is making good on his offer of a concise, accessible first course.
Crystal L. Downing, associate professor of English and
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film studies at Messiah College,
has written a very different
book in How Postmodernism
Serves (My) Faith. As one might
garner
from
her
title,
Downing's posture towards
postmodernism is less ambivalent than White's. Where
Postmodernism 101 offers a survey and some modest practical
responses to postmodernism,
Downing's book offers a deeper
survey and an appreciation of
postmodernism's influence on
Christianity. She has two main
grounds for praising postmodernism. First, postmodern ideas
have led to a greater openness
to Christianity in the academy.
Second, postmodern insights
can help to free Christians from
the corrupting influence of
modern thought.
Along with some helpful,
relatively in-depth explications
of postmodern movements and
specific thinkers, the book
offers a personal narrative of
the
author's
evangelical
upbringing, her intellectual
maturation, and finally, her
confrontation and rapprochement with postmodernism.
Downing's embrace of postmodernism could be recounted
as follows: faced with a caste of
thought (modernism) that
seemed
thoroughly
antiChristian, Downing "welcomed
whatever might bring to ruin
an intellectual edifice that [has]
posted at its door 'Christians
not allowed"' (56). The beneficent vandal turned out to be
postmodernism.
In the process of making her
case for postmodernism as a
servant of Christian faith,
Downing demonstrates wide

reading in the postmodern corpus. The thematically organized chapters are packed thick
with in-depth treatments of
Lacan, Derrida, Foucault, and
others. Downing augments her
philosophical readings with a
lively sense of the place that art
has played in the modem/postmodern story. There is much to
recommend Downing's erudite
treatment of how these forces
play off one another in the
sweep of history. But How
Postmodernism Serves (My) Faith
is ultimately, as noted above, an
apologia for postmodernism's
influence on Christianity, not
an even-handed examination.
The reader gets just enough
Thomas Huxley, "Darwin's
bulldog," to recoil from the
anti-religious
"sneers"
of
"hubristic" modernism, and
just enough Derrida to breathe
a sigh of relief. In postmodernism, one feels, we have
found a philosophy that
"allows us to share [our] faith
with impunity" (213).
For example, Downing
quotes Derrida's statement,
made at the 2002 American
Academy of Religion conference, that he "prays" to the
"unnamable" god of negative
theology- a god who Derrida
generally refers to simply as
"the impossible," and who is
not expected to answer. The
negative, or apophatic, theology that Derrida refers to flourished in medieval Christian
thought. Apophatic theology
emphasizes the inability of
human language finally to
grasp the truth about God.
Thus, if God is to be treated in
language, he is best treated by

negation. All we can really say
is what God is not. Many orthodox Catholic theologians, such
as St. John of the Cross, pseudoDionysius, and Meister Eckhart
are counted among the ranks of
negative theologians. Indeed,
there is a notable element of
apophaticism in the theology of
the "Angelic Doctor" himself
(Thomas Aquinas) who writes
that "no names belong to God
in any sense that we can give
them." Augustine, too, writes
that if anyone describes what
God is, then it is not God that
has been described.
Downing treats Derrida's
"prayer" in tandem with her
brief treatment of medieval
Christian apophaticism, highlighting the obvious analogy
between the two. The problem
is that she nowhere mentions
Derrida's explicit rejection of
negative theology. It is true that
Derrida himself considers at

times the possibility that his
project of deconstruction shares
a great deal with Meister
Eckhart's project of Christian
apophatic theology. But in the
end, Derrida indicts Eckhart for
intellectual dishonesty. Eckhart,
Derrida decides, illicitly has
retained a residual confidence
in his ability to know something about God. If we truly
cannot say anything affirmative
about God, how can we
''believe" in him? What is to
keep us from atheism? The only
honest response to our linguistic limitations is, according to
Derrida, to cease speaking of
God altogether-to give up the
thought that we can know him.
How this part of Derrida's
thought is compatible with
Christianity is a problem that
Downing
leaves
entirely
untouched. (For an account of
Derrida's relationship with
Eckhart, see Denys Turner, ''The

Art of Unknowing: Negative
Theology in Late Medieval
Mysticism," Modern Theology,
Oct. 1998).
It is indeed a fact that the
rise of postmodernism has contributed to the "return of religion" into the academic conversation. But one need not be a
full-blooded modernist to look
with some suspicion on the
type of welcome that postmodern thought extends to
Christian belief. It may be that
such suspicion is unwarranted,
but Downing has not here done
enough to allay it. Despite these
though,
both
criticisms,
Downing's
and
White's
attempts to equip evangelical
Christians for this important
conversation are, as I noted at
the beginning of this article,
most welcome. f
Ian Marcus Corbin
Yale Divinity School

the attic
Sin and the Love of God
(first published June 1957)

Karl H. Henrichs
God commendeth His love
toward us, in that, while we were
yet sinners, Christ died for us.
Romans 5:8
n our text the great Apostle,
Paul, speaks of sin, the love of
God, and the death of Christ.
While we were yet sinners. The
truth that we are sinners is, of
all Christian teachings, the
hardest for modern man to
believe. "There is nothing
wrong with human nature; man
is a little weak, but fundamentally he is good," thus writes
many a psychologist and
philosopher. How different this
estimate of man from that of
Jesus who-and He knew what
was in the heart of man-characterized His generation and all
generations as adulterous and
sinful. At the moment when
man declared himself independent of God, he thought he
was asserting himself; but, in
reality, he was condemning
himself to death, for God alone is
life. When Adam and Eve disobeyed, they separated themselves from the very source of
life. It is now man's tragic
predicament that sin is inherent
in him. By nature we make ourselves to be our own centers,
our own laws. We have faith in
ourselves and it's an evil self.
Unless that center be shifted
from ourselves to God, we live
in sin and we are lost.

I
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Listen to this from a lad
who writes to his pastor:
"There's a word in your sermons that always makes me
shy off. It's the word 'sin.' I
don't believe there is such a
thing. Who's to say what's true
and how serious it is to be
wrong?" Simply and flatly the
answer to this lad and to all
men is: God in His Holy Word
has said what is true and how
serious sin is, and He has said it
so clearly that ignorance on this
matter is almost impossible. All
through the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries we were
busy building up a philosophy
which made right and wrong a
matter of custom for the most
part. God had very little to do
with it. We've got to get rid of
it. That philosophy has refuted
itself in our world utterly and
dismally. We can't desert it
promptly enough. Down at the
bottom of human life there is a
will. God's will, that didn't
arrive with evolution in 1850,
or with relativity in 1900. It
isn't a whim. It doesn't change
with circumstances. It's a settled mind. And when you and I
are out of line with the will of
God, we sin. Yes, you and I
have sinned. We have come
short of the glory of God. Let
us acknowledge that fact fully
and freely today and say with
David: "0 Lord, I acknowledge
my transgressions;" with Paul

let us cry out: "0 wretched
man that I am"; and with the
publican humbly pray: "God,
be merciful to me a sinner."
In our text Paul speaks of
the love of God. God commendeth His love toward us.
Down through the ages the
common cry of sinful man has
been: "Wherewithal shall I
come before the Lord, and bow
myself before the high God?" A
holy God and a sinful man are
the two poles of a moral world.
How are we to reach God?
Where is the creature that can
do it? The affair would be desperate, indeed, if God would
not come to us, since it was not
in our power to rise to Him. The
answer is "Emmanuel," a "God
with us," some One divine who
would join us and struggle for
us; some One who sympathizes
and agonizes. Yes, God hates
sin, but He loves the sinner, and
He in Christ dies for us that we
might live. "Herein is love, not
that we loved God; but that He
loved us and sent His Son to be
the propitiation for our sins.''
God's love is not lazy goodnature nor foolish indulgence
like that whereby some parents
spoil their children; God's love
is not merely a matter of closing an eye to sin; no, it is rigidly
righteous, it demands a price;
and therefore Christ died for us.
Do you raise the question:
"How can God love and par-

don, and yet satisfy His
justice?" In this world someone,
somewhere pays for all error
and crime. There is no state on
earth that has no jail, no punishment, no court-however corrupt it be. To be simply pardoned will never satisfy. In
order to have peace of conscience, you and I need to know
that someone, somewhere,
somehow has paid for the debts
that we feel we have and cannot
settle. You and I need to see
divine justice not abolished, not
put aside, but accomplished. Who satisfied the
demands of divine justice?
Christ on the Cross, when
He died for us. "Christ His
ownself bare our sins in
His own body on the tree."
(1 Peter 2:24)
Liberal theology pictures Christ as an ideal
philanthropist and teacher
and martyr who died for a
cause. We cannot worship
the Jesus of modern theology, for He is only a man, while
faith demands an object higher
than ourselves. Furthermore, if
an innocent man had been
nailed to the cross for the sins
of others, the cross would be
unfair and unjust even to
human eyes. But, if this innocent One on the Cross is Christ,
the Godman, God Himselfthen what a change! What
seemed injustice appears as
mercy; the Judge becomes the
victim; the One who is
offended sacrifices Himself for
the sake of His enemies. Yes,
God was in Christ reconciling
the world unto Himself. When
Paul, by the grace of God,
understood this truth, he was

no longer a tortured man
afraid of God's judgment, but a
man at peace with his Maker.
No longer is he terrified when
he thinks of God; now the love
of God absorbs him, a love that
produces joy unspeakable.
God commendeth His love
toward us, in that, while we were
yet sinners, Christ died for us.
These words are spoken to all
of you who are sorrowful, sick
of soul, and laden with unhappiness because of sin. While we
are grateful for inventions,

God's love is not lazy
goodnature nor foolish
indugence like that whereby
some parents spoil their
children; God 's love is not
merely a matter of closing an
eye to sin; no, it is rigidly
righteous, it demands a price;
and therefore Christ died for us.
political constitutions, international agreements for a lasting
peace, financial schemes, and
education, these are not
enough. Human ingenuity and
cunning can do nothing for
you and me who have sinned.
The world can tempt our souls;
it can tell us that sin doesn't
matter; it can assure us that the
forbidden tree is as good to
taste as to look at. But after the
soul has sinned, do you think
the world can do anything to
take the stain away or heal the
wound? The only thing it can
do is either to keep silence or
to mock us as the Scribes and
Pharisees mocked Judas when
his conscience had been awak-

ened and he flung down before
them the thirty pieces of silver.
But, my dear friends, as we
behold Christ hanging on the
Cross and giving up His ghost,
I say, in God's name. He died
for you. Your sin is condemned
and punished. You have peace
with God. Behold the living
and loving God who in Christ
is your Father in heaven!
These words are spoken to
those who have been living
unto themselves, without God.
Money, honor, prestige, pleasure, learning, all these are
good in themselves; but
when they become the
object of your heart's affection, they cannot and do
not satisfy. Will you not
today arise and worship
Him who commends His
love toward you?
These words are spoken
to the nation. The present
world crisis is the result of
man's failure to acknowledge the lordship of God,
who made and upholds the
world. We are still a great
nation, a great people; and the
present crisis can be overcome if
we change our attitude toward
life and acknowledge the
supremacy of God. The nation
that repents will be forgiven and
renewed. God blessed Egypt
because of Joseph who feared
Him and He will again bless
America and the world when
men return to the worship of
Him who died on the Cross.
Let me tell you a story, and
leave you with it at the foot of
the Cross. It's a story about a
young woman, and a nurse,
and God. She was a girl of the
slums and her life was nothing

pretty to look at. They had
brought her into the hospital
from the ambulance, stabbed
and
dying.
Everything
appeared to be and was quite
hopeless; and the nurse was
asked by the doctor simply to
sit by until death came. As she
sat there thinking what a pity it
was that a face as young as that
should have such coarse lines
on it, the girl opened her eyes.

66167 The Cresset Lent I 2007

"I want you to tell me something, and tell me straight," she
said. "Do you think God cares
about people like me?" The
nurse, startled, couldn't speak
for a moment. Never before
had she been asked such a
question. She didn't dare to
answer until she had reached
out to God herself. Then she
said, knowing now that it was
true: "I'm telling you straight;

God does care about you; and
He forgives you in Christ."
With a smile the girl slipped
back into unconsciousness;
and when death set the lines
on her face, they had changed.
What do you think? Did something happen between that girl
and God? And did it have anything to do with what happened long ago on a "green
Hill outside a city wall?" f
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